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WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT:  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT HABEAS CLAIMS DURING COVID-19 
 
Michael L. Zuckerman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a lawyer with clients inside a prison under which a 
sinkhole has just opened.  The prison is slowly sinking into the ground 
and filling with water.  Though the prison is attempting to pump out 
excess water, the water level is projected to rise some five or so feet over 
the coming weeks. 
Some of the people incarcerated at the prison are taller and know how 
to swim, which suggests that they will be unlikely to drown to death, 
though their imprisonment will become more uncomfortable than usual.  
Some are shorter or do not know how to swim, which suggests that they 
will be more likely to drown to death—though, of course, it is possible 
that some or even many of these people will also survive. 
You are alarmed that the prison is not moving these people out of the 
sinking prison.  But when you complain about the danger, the Warden 
responds that the prisoners were all validly convicted and sentenced and 
that the prison staff are working hard to mitigate the water-level rise by 
pumping out the excess water.  They are also providing the prisoners with 
flotation devices in the meantime.   
You have heard reports from your clients that these measures have not 
been as widely implemented as the Warden claims.  But you are also not 
convinced that, even if these measures  are implemented as promised, they 
are effective enough to protect your clients from a substantial risk of 
serious harm.  Simply being incarcerated in this sinking prison itself, you 
might think, violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.  
What do you do? 
You may do something similar to what a small constellation of lawyers 
around the country (myself included) tried to do as the novel coronavirus, 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Litigation Counsel, 
Ohio Justice & Policy Center.  For much of the initial thinking behind this piece, I thank the lawyers I 
worked with on some of the issues discussed within, especially David Carey, Kirti Datla, Freda Levenson, 
Joseph Mead, David Singleton, and Mark Vander Laan.  For valuable feedback on drafts, I thank Forrest 
Behne, Doug Berman, Caroline Cox, Jonathan Gould, Lee Kovarsky, Aaron Littman, Joseph Mead, Ben 
Notterman, David Singleton, and Carol Steiker.  For able assistance with research, I thank Nicholas 
Maxwell, Elizabeth Potts, and Isaac Shapiro.  I extend deep thanks as well to the editors of the University 
of Cincinnati Law Review.  I dedicate this piece to our clients.  All errors are my own.  
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COVID-19, spread rapidly in state and federal prisons, jails, and other 
detention facilities.  In this Article, I tell the story of eight major cases 
involving COVID-19 in prisons and discuss the legal issues and tensions 
that arose from these cases.  The overall trajectory of these cases is 
dispiriting: a foreseeable risk to the health and lives of people whose 
wellbeing is at the mercy of the state became an unnecessary disaster, 
with hundreds of thousands of prisoners infected by the spring of 2021 
and more than two thousand dead. 
My goals in this Article are threefold.  First, I hope to provide a starting 
point for practitioners or incarcerated people who may find themselves 
litigating similar issues in the future—seeking release from confinement 
that itself violates the Eighth Amendment.  Because these issues are 
complex and inherently urgent, there is rarely the luxury of extended 
doctrinal research.1 
Second, I hope to make a record of what transpired before the world 
moves on and these cases are lost to the sands of Westlaw and Lexis.  
Chronicling what has happened—even (or especially) when one disagrees 
with the results—is valuable in and of itself.2 
Third, I offer a critical analysis of the cases themselves and the doctrine 
involved.  While the cases hinged on an unprecedented factual 
backdrop—a worldwide pandemic—the doctrinal tensions that arose and 
the trends that the cases followed are by no means unique.  Rather, they 
cast in harsher relief much that was already true about mass incarceration 
in the United States and the law that confronts those who wish to make 
the system more humane.  The conditions of incarceration are bad, and in 
virtually all cases throughout our “carceral archipelago,”3 they put people 
at much graver risk of harm than they would otherwise face.4  The 
procedural and substantive hurdles to remedying those risks through 
 
 1.  In doing so, I do not write on a blank slate.  See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in 
the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2020); Sharon Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet 
COVID-19, 11/16/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 4; Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, 
109 CALIF. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2021); Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 71 (2020); Developments in the Law — Conditions of Confinement, Covid-19, and the CDC, 
134 HARV. L. REV. 2233 (2021).  I had submitted a full draft of this piece before learning of Professors 
Garrett and Kovarsky’s forthcoming Article, so I distinguish at a few points within where I later drew on 
their work, where I independently came to a similar conclusion, and where I respectfully part ways with 
their analysis. 
 2.  Cf. Hon. Bernice B. Donald, Judicial Independent, Collegiality, and the Problem of Dissent 
in Multi-Member Courts, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317, 329–30 (2019) (discussing and collecting sources 
addressing the value of dissenting opinions as keeping alive the possibility of persuading a majority in the 
future).   
 3.  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 298 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 
1977) (1975).  
 4.  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 886–89 (2009); Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 
152–153 (2020). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1
2021] WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT 3 
litigation are tall to begin with, and they sometimes seem to grow taller 
when even the existing rules would seem to dictate victory for the 
plaintiffs.5  Given the unparalleled size and scope of American 
incarceration, the stakes of such an unforgiving doctrinal landscape are 
immense.6 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I offers a brief overview of the 
legal landscape as COVID-19 arose—both the barriers to successful 
claims by incarcerated people and the (limited) legal paths to 
decarceration that were available.  Part II surveys recent jurisprudential 
history, detailing eight prominent federal cases involving Eighth 
Amendment claims arising out of COVID-19 outbreaks at carceral 
facilities, most of which involved in-depth litigation over the availability 
of release via habeas corpus.  Part III, the heart of the Article, discusses 
the key tensions raised by these cases—each a potential stumbling block 
for courts and litigants.  Specifically, Part III addresses: (A) the 
interaction between habeas, classic “conditions of confinement” cases, 
and the relevant legal constraints on each type of suit; (B) the nature of 
Eight Amendment “deliberate indifference” under these circumstances; 
(C) what procedural devices, such as class-wide representation, are proper 
for adjudicating these claims in an efficient and effective way; (D) 
federalism and comity concerns that arise when the institution at issue is 
a state facility and how these concerns may cash out through exhaustion 
requirements; (E) unsettled questions regarding temporary release as a 
form of preliminary versus final relief; and (F) the relationship between 
rights and remedies in this context.  Part IV proposes statutory and 
jurisprudential solutions to these tensions and concludes.  
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AS THE CRISIS UNFOLDED 
Prisoners in this country don’t have many good years, but 1996 was an 
especially bad one.7  That was the year that both the Antiterrorism and 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Godfrey, supra note 4, at 155, 171–74; Dolovich, supra note 4, at 895–907; see also 
Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 43–53 (coming to a similar conclusion).  
 6.  See, e.g., Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice 
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 816 (2017) (noting that the United States incarcerates roughly 2.2 million 
people, “more than any other country on Earth,” and, “[w]ith just 5% of the world’s 
population, . . . incarcerates nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners”).  It bears emphasizing, too, that “[m]ass 
incarceration has not touched all communities equally,” but rather includes substantial racial disparities. 
See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Criminal Justice Facts, 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/. “Black men are six times as likely to be 
incarcerated as white men,” for example, “and Latinos are more than 2.5 times as likely.”  Id. This means, 
of course, that carceral infections will also disproportionately affect racial minorities, given that they are 
incarcerated at disproportionate rates to begin with.  
 7.  Where I do so, I use the term “prisoners” with awareness that there is a range of feelings, most 
centrally among incarcerated people themselves, about this and other labels.  See generally Blair Hickman, 
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Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)8 and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA) came into full force.9  These Colossus cousins now stand 
astride the two main courthouse doors open to U.S. prisoners.  Neither is 
welcoming.  
2020 was also an especially bad year—it was the year that COVID-19 
swept through the nation’s jails, prisons, and detention facilities.10  As of 
September 2020, the known prisoner fatality rate was twice as high as the 
broader public rate.11  As of late December 2020, at least 275,000 
prisoners had tested positive, a number that equates roughly to one in five 
 
Inmate.  Prisoner.  Other.  Discussed., MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2015, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/03/inmate-prisoner-other-discussed (collecting reported 
preferences and thoughts from incarcerated and non-incarcerated respondents).  In keeping with at least 
one plurality’s preference, id., and my own inclination, I primarily use “incarcerated person” or 
“incarcerated people” when speaking at a high level of generality.  Where, as in this piece, I seek to 
distinguish between people incarcerated in prisons specifically—as opposed to incarcerated in jails (where 
they may be detained pretrial and legally innocent) or immigration detention facilities—I use the word 
“prisoner” to communicate that more specific meaning.  When quoting other authors, I retain whatever 
terminology these authors use (the words themselves being a form of data).  See also Akiba Solomon, 
What Words We Use–and Avoid–When Covering People and Incarceration, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 
12, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/04/12/what-words-we-use-and-avoid-
when-covering-people-and-incarceration.  
  In some instances, I use the word “prisoner” because I fear the risk of sanitizing that comes 
with more progressive terms.  The millions of people our society has chosen to incarcerate are much more 
than prisoners, but we should not allow ourselves to look away from, or sand the edges off, the fact that 
we have also made them prisoners, in many cases when there was no good reason to do so.  See generally, 
e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD (2017); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); RUTH 
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG (2007); ABBE SMITH, GUILTY PEOPLE (2020); Guyora Binder & Ben 
Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2017); Allegra M. 
McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015).  
 8.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 9.  Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 10.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Editorial Board, America Is Letting the Coronavirus Rage Through 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/opinion/sunday/ 
coronavirus-prisons-jails.html.  
 11.  KEVIN T. SCHNEPEL, COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COVID-19 IN U.S. STATE AND 
FEDERAL PRISONS 3 (Sept. 2020).  Some skeptics protest that incarcerated people may be more likely to 
come from communities that have sustained high COVID-19 infection rates, and that therefore they might 
still be safer in prison; I have seen at least a few prosecutors offer such speculations.  But these assertions 
ignore the degree to which prisons themselves may contribute to extramural spread, and the fact that the 
calculation cited above already accounts for several variables—including state, age, and race/ethnicity, 
id. at 6—gives further cause (especially under conditions of de facto segregation) to conclude that this 
skepticism is misguided. See Jordan Wilkie, Prisons Contribute to Racial Imbalance in COVID-19 Impact 
in NC, CAROLINA PUB. PRESS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://carolinapublicpress.org/42342/prisons-contribute-
to-racial-imbalance-in-covid-19-impact-in-nc. More fundamentally, however, the prisoners-are-safer 
argument fails to account for the moral significance of the state taking away a person’s ability to make 
his own health-related choices and instead subjecting him to a situation that poses a particular risk of 
infection and death.  See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 
(1989); cf. Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, 
and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 756–74 (2005).  (Like others, I use male pronouns where 
necessary because most people incarcerated in the United States are men.  See, e.g., Godfrey, supra note 
4, at 153 n.12.) 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1
2021] WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT 5 
prisoners—a rate that is, in turn, four times that of the broader population 
yet still likely “a vast undercount.”12  By March 29, 2021, that number 
exceeded 390,000 cases.13  Over two thousand prisoners have died.14 
Little more needs to be said about the dangers of COVID-19, which 
has dominated much of the year’s discourse.  The core, largely undisputed 
facts relevant to incarcerated people are: (1) that COVID-19 is a highly 
infectious respiratory disease that especially afflicts older people and 
people with certain health conditions, both of which are groups that 
represent a growing share of prisoners; (2) that in the absence of a vaccine 
or effective therapy, the only effective way to avoid transmission is to 
engage in social distancing; and (3) that prisons, like cruise ships and 
nursing homes, are the kind of congregate environments that are 
especially susceptible to rapid and unchecked COVID-19 transmission.15  
Everyone who was paying attention feared that COVID-19‘s arrival 
would be catastrophic for incarcerated people.16  And the data above 
show, those fears have largely been confirmed.17 
 
 12.  See Beth Schwartzapfel et al., 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. Has Had COVID-19, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-s-
has-had-covid-19.  
 13.  A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2021). The Marshall Project stopped collecting this data in June 2021. Id. For more recent 
data, see COVID PRISON PROJECT, https://covidprisonproject.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021). 
 14.  MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 13 (as of Mar. 29, 2021); see also COVID PRISON PROJECT, 
supra note 13.  By that time, COVID-19 had already killed more prisoners than have been executed under 
the modern death penalty.  Doug Berman, The New Death Penalty: COVID Has Now Killed in Nine 
Months More U.S. Prisoners Than Capital Punishment over Last 50+ Years, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y 
BLOG (Dec. 5, 2020), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/12/the-new-
death-penalty-covid-has-now-killed-in-nine-months-more-us-prisoners-than-capital-punishment-.html.  
 15.  E.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): 
Guidance for Correctional & Detention Facilities, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2021); 
Andre G. Montoya-Barthelemy et al., COVID-19 and the Correctional Environment: The American 
Prison as a Focal Point for Public Health, 58 AM. J. PREV. MED. 888 (2020); Weihua Li & Nicole Lewis, 
This Chart Shows Why The Prison Population Is So Vulnerable to COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 
19, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/19/this-chart-shows-why-the-prison-
population-is-so-vulnerable-to-covid-19.  Because the litigation on which this Article focuses predates the 
availability of a COVID-19 vaccine, I cabin my discussion accordingly.  
 16.  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Prisons are 
tinderboxes for infectious disease.  The question whether the government can protect inmates from 
COVID-19 is being answered every day, as outbreaks appear in new facilities.”); Danielle Ivory, We Are 
Not a Hospital: A Prison Braces for the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/coronavirus-prisons-jails.html; Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter 
of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion/coronavirus-in-jails.html; Li & Lewis, supra note 15.  
 17.  See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.  One potential countervailing shift is that 
courts at least temporarily slowed the rates at which they were sending people to prisons; the federal 
prison population, ended 2020 at a “new modern low of 152,184.”  See Doug Berman, Federal Prison 
Population Closes Out 2020 at New Modern Low of 152,184 According to BOP, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y 
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This Part provides a brief overview of the legal landscape as the 
COVID-19 pandemic took root, focusing on (A) AEDPA’s legal barriers 
to bringing successful federal habeas corpus claims, (B) the PLRA’s legal 
barriers to bringing successful prison-conditions claims, and (C) legal 
provisions authorizing prisoner release that were or became available as 
the pandemic emerged. 
A. Habeas Corpus and AEPDA 
“[T]he traditional function of” the writ of habeas corpus “is to secure 
release from illegal custody.”18  Federal law allows any district court, 
acting within its “respective jurisdiction,”19 to grant a writ of habeas 
corpus whenever a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States.”20  Such a “court shall summarily 
hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice 
require.”21 
That is capacious statutory text.  It has, of course, been substantially 
cabined—sometimes by Congress, sometimes by federal courts—in many 
classic habeas scenarios.  For example, state prisoners seeking to 
challenge the validity of their convictions or sentences are subject to the 
restrictions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, which include an automatic 
prohibition on repeated claims,22 automatic forfeiture of many (though 
not all) claims not presented in an earlier habeas petition,23 mandatory 
exhaustion of available and effective state remedies,24 and an extremely 
high bar for review, requiring either a profound error by the last state court 
to review the prisoner’s case on the merits or a basis in constitutional 
 
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2020), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/12/federal-
prison-population-closes-out-2020-at-new-modern-low-of-152184-according-to-bop.html.  Some jails 
and local courts took at least provisional steps to reduce the number of people detained pretrial or 
incarcerated for misdemeanors and other low-level offenses.  See generally PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic (May 18, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
virus/virusresponse.html.  But the raw numbers still speak for themselves, and the fact that things could 
have gone worse does not mean that they went well.   
 18.  Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); see also Hamama v. Homan, 912 F.3d 869, 
875 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The traditional remedy provided by habeas is ‘removing the injury of unjust and 
illegal confinement.’” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
137 (1768))). 
 19.  28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).  
 20.  Id. § 2241(c)(3).   
 21.  Id. § 2243.   
 22.  Id. § 2244(b)(1).  
 23.  Id. § 2244(b)(2) (with exceptions for (i) new, retroactive constitutional rules recognized by 
the Supreme Court and (ii) newly discovered evidence that “could not have been discovered through . . . 
due diligence,” so long as these facts plus the overall record would “establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty”).   
 24.  Id. § 2254(b)(1).  
6
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doctrine newly promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court or newly 
available, previously undiscoverable-with-ordinary-diligence facts.25   
Similarly, though somewhat less restrictively, while a federal prisoner 
“claiming the right to be released upon the ground that [his] sentence was” 
illegal or otherwise unjustified may file a petition under § 2255 “to vacate, 
set aside or correct the sentence.”26  These motions are subject to another 
set of constraints outlined in § 2255, including a one-year period of 
limitations27 and limits on subsequent filings that resemble those imposed 
on incarcerated people who were convicted in state court.28   
B. Prisoner Civil-Rights Suits and the PLRA 
Enacted in the shadow of a high number of prisoner filings, the PLRA, 
in theory, was meant to facilitate “fewer and better prisoner suits.”29  Its 
critics have noted that its “new decision standards have imposed new and 
very high hurdles so that even constitutionally meritorious cases are often 
thrown out of court.”30 
The PLRA places multiple constraints on courts whenever they are 
asked to issue “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to 
prison conditions.”31   For instance, the PLRA proscribes preliminary 
injunctive relief unless it is “narrowly drawn,” extends “no further than 
necessary to correct the harm,” and is “the least intrusive means necessary 
to correct that harm.”32  The law likewise prohibits any “prisoner release 
order” until the court has already entered a “less intrusive” order that “has 
failed to remedy the deprivation” after a “reasonable amount of time” for 
compliance.33  The PLRA also requires that any such release order be 
issued by a three-judge court,34 which itself is subject to a strict standard 
of review: the court must find, under a clear-and-convincing standard, that 
the violation is primarily caused by “crowding” and that no other relief 
will suffice.35  On top of that, and more, the statute imposes a strict 
 
 25.  Id. § 2254(d)–(e). 
 26.  Id. § 2255(a).  
 27.  Id. § 2255(f).  
 28.  See id. § 2255(h).  
 29.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007). 
 30.  Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1644 (2003); see Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 
52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1772 n.10 (2003) (collecting sources).  
 31.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).  
 32.  § 3626(a)(2).  
 33.  § 3626(a)(3)(A).  
 34.  § 3626(a)(3)(B).  
 35.  § 3626(a)(3)(E).  Read literally, this language would seem to suggest that even a three-judge 
court cannot provide for prisoner releases if “crowding” is not the source of the constitutional problem.  
As at least one court has noted, that cannot be right.  See Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1223–24 
7
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exhaustion requirement.36  The PLRA’s restrictions regarding any “civil 
action with respect to prison conditions” do not, however, apply to 
“habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of 
confinement in prison.”37 As discussed further below, this language came 
to the fore in most of the major COVID-19 habeas cases.  
C. Release Authorities  
Federal prisoners facing COVID-19 were not, however, without 
options—nor were judges or executive officials who might have wished 
to move them to safety.  On the judicial side, federal prisoners can apply 
for “compassionate release” by showing that “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”38  In addition, as discussed 
below, they can seek a writ of habeas corpus. 
On the executive side, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has 
several tools at its disposal.  For one, it can grant 30-day furloughs for 
medical treatment or “engaging in any other significant activity consistent 
with the public interest.”39  Even before COVID-19, it was also 
empowered to “conduct a pilot program” for home confinement for 
“eligible elderly offenders and eligible terminally ill offenders.”40  In 
addition, the BOP can put prisoners nearing the end of their terms on pre-
release home confinement.41   
The federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(“CARES”) Act42 enhanced these powers.  Specifically, Congress 
provided that, “[d]uring the covered emergency period, if the Attorney 
General finds that emergency conditions will materially affect the 
functioning of the Bureau, the Director of the Bureau may lengthen the 
 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[I]magine that a prison were so dilapidated that no one could predict when the walls 
would crumble down . . . but that Defendants refused to transfer those inmates despite being aware of that 
risk . . . .  [C]rowding would not be the cause (let alone the primary cause) of the constitutional violation, 
and adopting [such an] interpretation of ‘prisoner release order’ would thus prevent any court — single-
judge or three-judge — from entering a transfer order. . . . This would prevent vindication of the inmates’ 
constitutional rights and would therefore be impermissible.”).  Another court has speculated that “[t]he 
reference to ‘crowding’ may have the effect of removing single-plaintiff cases from within the ambit of 
Section 3626(a)(3), because an order involving only one inmate might not be viewed as reducing a prison 
population in any meaningful way.”  Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 2020). 
 36.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) 
 37.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). 
 38.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see, e.g., United States v. Pabon, 458 F. Supp. 3d 296, 300 (E.D. 
Pa. 2020) (granting compassionate release to prisoner with significant COVID-19 comorbidities). Certain 
federal prisoners can also seek compassionate release when they have reached 70 years of age and served 
at least 30 years in prison.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).  
 39.  18 USC § 3622(a)(3), (6). 
 40.  34 U.S.C. § 60541(g). 
 41.  18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). 
 42.  Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020).  
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maximum amount of time for which the Director is authorized to place a 
prisoner in home confinement.”43  On March 26, 2020, Attorney General 
Barr directed BOP officials “to prioritize the use of [existing] statutory 
authorities to grant home confinement for inmates seeking transfer in 
connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.”44  On April 3, 2020, 
he issued a follow-up memorandum activating the CARES Act provision 
and directing facilities with significant COVID-19 outbreaks (among 
them FCI Oakdale, FCI Danbury, and FCI Elkton) “to move with dispatch 
in using home confinement, where appropriate, to move vulnerable 
inmates out of these institutions.”45  
 While this Article focuses on litigation in the federal courts (albeit 
in many cases regarding state facilities), state courts and state executive 
officials were not powerless.  In Ohio (where I practice), many state 
prisoners are eligible to apply for “judicial release” under state law, at 
least so long as they are serving nonmandatory sentences and have served 
a required portion of those sentences.46  Most governors, meanwhile, had 
the power to grant commutations or reprieves with limited procedural 
constraints, which would have allowed them to grant prisoners the ability 
to defer the balance of their sentences until it would be safe for those 
sentences to resume.47  There have also been significant habeas cases in 
state court yielding at least temporary relief under state law.48 
 
 43.  Id. § 12003(b)(2). 
 44.  William Barr, Memorandum to Director of Bureau of Prisons, Prioritization of Home 
Confinement as Appropriate in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/bop_memo_home_confinement.pdf. 
 45.  William Barr, Memorandum to Director of Bureau of Prisons, Increasing Use of Home 
Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID-19, at 1 (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/bop_memo_home_confinement_april3.pdf [hereinafter “Barr 
Memo”]; see also id. (“Immediately maximize appropriate transfers to home confinement of all 
appropriate inmates held at FCI Oakdale, FCI Danbury, FCI Elkton, and at other similarly situated BOP 
facilities where COVID-19 is materially affecting operations”). As will become clear later on, these 
exhortations went largely unheeded.  
 46.  See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.20. For a summary of nascent state efforts to allow for a “second 
look” at sentences, see Nazgol Ghandnoosh, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE 
(May 12, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/a-second-look-at-injustice/.  
 47.  See Joshua Vaughn, A Rarely Used Power Could Free Prisoners in Pennsylvania. But the 
Governor Is Not Using It., THE APPEAL (Mar. 31, 2020), https://theappeal.org/pennsylvania-coronavirus-
governor-prison-reprieves/; Rachel Barkow, Our Leaders Have the Power to Release People in Prison. 
Now They Must Use It., THE APPEAL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-prison-
commutations/; Ben Notterman, Reprieves May Be the Smartest Way to Get Virus-Vulnerable People out 
of U.S. Prisons, WITNESS LA (Apr. 20, 2020), https://witnessla.com/op-ed-reprieves-may-be-the-
smartest-way-to-get-virus-vulnerable-people-out-of-u-s-prisons/; Michael Zuckerman, The Fastest Way 
for Gov. DeWine to Save Lives in Ohio Prisons, OHIO CAPITAL JOURNAL (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2020/04/20/the-fast-way-for-gov-dewine-to-save-lives-in-ohio-prisons/.  
See generally NYU CENTER ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, USING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 
TO MITIGATE THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/adminofcriminallaw/COVID-19 (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).  
 48.  See, e.g., In re Von Staich, 56 Cal. App. 5th 53, 84 (2020) (ordering state officials “to 
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 Many of these tools were inefficient; they required applications, 
waiting periods, and sometimes high degrees of individualized analysis, 
disproportionate to the speed at which a disease like COVID-19 can move 
through a prison.49  And in any event, none was used with the vigor that 
prisoners and their loved ones would have hoped for in the face of a 
dangerous, rapidly advancing pandemic.  For those reasons and others, 
prisoners and their attorneys often turned to the federal courts.  Part II 
surveys eight significant cases and the timeline over which they unfolded.  
II. PROMINENT COVID-19 PRISON AND JAIL LITIGATION 
COVID-19 litigation in the federal courts raised a number of 
complicated legal questions in a novel, urgent context.  This Part provides 
an illustrative survey of eight prominent cases.  It summarizes six cases 
in which incarcerated people sought habeas relief based on an asserted 
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause: Section A of this Part examines four cases involving prisons, and 
therefore, people already convicted of crimes. Section B assesses two 
cases involving jails, which house people serving relatively short 
sentences and as well as pretrial detainees who were denied or unable to 
afford bail.  Section C summarizes two cases involving civil-rights claims 
for improvements in the conditions of confinement themselves (that is, 
non-habeas relief) that nevertheless illustrate important trends in the 
relevant Eighth Amendment analysis.  Finally, Section D briefly 
rehearses the overall timeline.  By taking a deeper dive into a smaller 
number of cases, this Part seeks to demonstrate for readers focused on the 
habeas remedy how the core issues regarding government confinement 
and the pandemic played out at a granular level, while also providing 
readers more generally with a wider-angle view of how the cases unfolded 
and intersected as a group.50  These descriptive summaries also help to tee 
 
immediately commence the design and implementation of plans to expedite release or transfer of the 
number of inmates necessary to reduce San Quentin’s population to 50 percent of its June 2020 
population”), vacated, Staich on H.C., 477 P.3d 537 (Cal. 2020); Order on Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
Writ of Mandate, Campbell v. Barnes, No. 30-2020-01141117 (Cal. Orange Cnty Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 
2020) (ordering 50% reduction in population of all congregate areas in Orange County jails).  For more 
on these pathways, see Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 33–34.  Because this Article focuses on 
federal habeas claims, I do not delve into these types of cases, though the opportunities may be significant. 
 49.  See generally, e.g., United States v. Osorto, 445 F. Supp. 3d 103 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Breyer, J.) 
(providing history and overview of compassionate-release process in pandemic context).  
 50.  My method for picking these cases was not overly scientific—my goal was to cover different 
geographies (West, Midwest, South, Northeast); different types of criminal-process-related custody 
(prisons and jails); different types of claims (primarily habeas but some non-habeas); and different levels 
of success for incarcerated people in intensively lawyered impact litigation involving COVID-19 and the 
Eighth Amendment.  To that end, the cases I chose include the three that drew writing by members of the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Elkton, Valentine, Barnes); the two in which incarcerated people won lasting 
victories (Danbury, Lompoc); the first case to draw a lengthy opinion on the possibility of statewide relief 
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up the more analytical and normative discussion to which the Article turns 
in Part III.  
A. Prison Cases 
This Section discusses habeas litigation involving four prisons or 
prison systems, three of which are federal: FCI/FSL Elkton (litigation in 
which I participated), the Illinois prison system, FCI Danbury, and 
FCI/USP Lompoc.   
1. FCI/FSL Elkton 
To begin with the case I know best: the litigation surrounding Elkton, 
a low-security facility housing roughly 2,000 federal prisoners located in 
Lisbon, Ohio.51  In keeping with its low-security status, Elkton houses 
prisoners in “dormitory-style housing units” of 250–300 prisoners; 
“[e]ach side of a housing unit contains approximately 150 bunks resulting 
in two to three inmates sharing a cube and sleeping a few feet away from 
each other.”52  These open-bay conditions make social distancing 
impossible.  Similarly, other aspects of the facility’s layout ensure that 
prisoners will be “in close proximity” when showering, using the 
bathroom, picking up meals, or using phones and computers.53 
By early April 2020, Elkton was in the midst of a major COVID-19 
outbreak;54 it was one of the three federal facilities singled out by 
Attorney General Barr for maximal home confinement in his April 3, 
 
(Money); and two others (Cameron, Swain) that, as of August 2021 and not counting the cases already 
mentioned, are the most-cited appellate opinions (per Westlaw) issued in this vein between March and 
August 2020 (that is, the months during which litigation on these issues was seemingly at its zenith).  
There is, of course, no doubt that reasonable minds could substitute a different set.  In any event, as in 
modernist literature, there is value in zooming in on a smaller number of specific things, without need to 
rank relative grandeur.  For a higher-level analysis of trends that emerged across the full gamut of cases—
spanning different types of custody (including immigration detention, which I do not discuss), different 
judicial forums, and different forms of relief sought—see Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 23–43.   
 51.  See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2020).  Technically, Elkton is comprised 
of two facilities: FCI Elkton and FSL Elkton.  See id. at 832.  For simplicity, I use “Elkton” to refer to 
both, and some sources use “FCI Elkton” the same way.  For a thorough and more normative summary of 
the Elkton case, see Dolovich, supra note 1, at 21–24.  
 52.  Wilson, 961 F.3d at 833.  
 53.  See id. at 834–35; see also id. at 840.   
 54.  See Keri Blakinger & Keegan Hamilton, “I Begged Them To Let Me Die”: How Federal 
Prisons Became Coronavirus Death Traps, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/18/i-begged-them-to-let-me-die-how-federal-prisons-
became-coronavirus-death-traps; Shane Hoover, Fourth Inmate at Ohio Federal Prison in Elkton Dies 
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2020, memo.55  On April 13, 2020, four prisoners filed a federal suit on 
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Elkton prisoners 
claiming that these conditions violated the Eighth Amendment.56  They 
primarily sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or in the 
alternative, injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Eighth 
Amendment itself.57  On April 22, 2020, invoking habeas jurisdiction, 
Judge James Gwin issued a preliminary injunction.58   
At that time, there had been at least 59 prisoner infections, 46 staff 
infections, and six prisoner deaths.59  But the infection numbers 
themselves were impossible to know for sure because of “shockingly 
limited available testing,” as Elkton had “received only 50 COVID-19 
swab tests and one Abbott Rapid testing machine with 25 rapid tests.”  
Judge Gwin cited “Elkton’s testing debacle” as “one example of th[e] 
deliberate indifference” that he concluded the petitioners were likely to 
prove.60   
Judge Gwin conditionally certified a medically vulnerable subclass of 
Elkton prisoners and ordered the prison officials, including the BOP, to 
identify all members of the subclass and to evaluate each “for transfer out 
of Elkton through any means,” prioritizing review by medical 
vulnerability.61  Subclass members deemed “ineligible for compassionate 
release, home release, or parole or community supervision” would have 
to “be transferred to another BOP facility where appropriate measures, 
such as testing and single-cell placement, or social distancing, may be 
accomplished.”62  Although these prisoners would “remain in BOP 
custody, . . . the conditions of their confinement would be enlarged.”63 
The prison officials appealed and sought a stay from the district court 
 
 55.  Barr Memo, supra note 45, at 1.  
 56.  Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Injunctive, and Declaratory Relief, D.E. 1, 
Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-cv-794 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020).  This and many other federal-court filings 
are available from the University of Michigan Law School’s online Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).  
 57.  See id. at 3–4.  
 58.  Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated, 961 F.3d 829. 
 59.  Id. at 471, 480.   
 60.  Id. at 479.  As explained further below, see infra notes 312–317, the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits prison officials from being deliberately indifferent to a 
prisoner’s serious medical needs.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  The Supreme Court has 
held that this standard requires both objective and subjective indifference—both an actual, substantial risk 
and a conscious disregard of that risk by the officials.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837, 840 
(1994).  
 61.  Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 481.  
 62.  Id.   
 63.  Id. at 480–81.  Previously in the order, Judge Gwin explained that enlargement was “not 
release, although some courts refer to it using the terms release or bail,” but rather separate use of inherent 
judicial power to alter “the place of custody.”  Id. at 474.  For discussion of the enlargement power, see 
Section III.E, infra.   
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and the Sixth Circuit.  Both courts denied those requests, with the Sixth 
Circuit denial coming on May 4, 2020.64   
Compliance with the district court’s order, however, was halting.  On 
May 6, 2020, the prisoners filed a Motion for Enforcement with the 
district court.  On May 19, 2020, Judge Gwin granted that motion,65 
noting that Elkton had still conducted only 524 total tests66 and stating 
that the prison officials had been “thumbing their nose at their authority 
to authorize home confinement.”67  Judge Gwin ordered the officials “to 
make full use of” home confinement “beyond the paltry grants” it had 
made so far, including eliminating certain automatic bars and 
disregarding other factors, such as low or moderate incident reports, that 
had led to prior denials.68  He also ordered detailed explanations for any 
continued denials,69 responses to pending compassionate-release 
applications “within 7 days on a continuing basis,”70 and an explanation 
showing cause within seven days why each prisoner still denied home 
confinement or compassionate release could not be sent to a different 
prison where social distancing was achievable.71 
The next day, the prison officials sought a stay of the original 
preliminary injunction from the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court denied that request on May 26, 2020, but its brief statement noted 
that the officials were “seeking a stay only of the District Court’s April 
22 preliminary injunction” and had not yet “sought review of or a stay of 
the May 19 order” in the Sixth Circuit.72  “Particularly in light of that 
procedural posture,” the Court wrote, the request was denied “without 
prejudice to the Government seeking a new stay if circumstances 
warrant.”73  Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch would 
have granted the stay outright.74   
The prison officials soon filed renewed stay motions in the district 
court and the Sixth Circuit.  The Sixth Circuit issued a denial on June 1, 
 
 64.  Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-3447, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 14291 (6th Cir. May 4, 2020); see 
Wilson, 961 F.3d at 836. 
 65.  See Wilson, 961 F.3d at 836; see also Mot. to Enforce, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 
(N.D. Ohio May 6, 2020), D.E. 51; Order Granting Motion to Enforce, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-
00794 (N.D. Ohio May 19, 2020), D.E. 85.  
 66.  Order Granting Motion to Enforce at 2, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D. Ohio 
May 19, 2020), D.E. No. 85.  
 67.  Id. at 7.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 7–8.  
 70.  Id. at 9.  
 71.  Id. at 10.  
 72.  Denial of Appl. for Stay, Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1041 (May 26, 2020).  
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. 
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2020,75 and the district court followed suit on June 4, 2020.76  On June 1, 
2020, however, the prison officials also filed a renewed stay application 
with the U.S. Supreme Court.77  Justice Sotomayor issued an 
administrative stay on June 4, 2020, pending resolution of the appeal of 
the preliminary injunction, which was scheduled for oral argument the 
following day.78   
On June 9, 2020, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
preliminary injunction.79  Writing for the panel’s majority,80 Judge 
Gibbons first concluded that the district court properly exercised 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 2241 because the prisoners were asserting 
“that there are no conditions of confinement sufficient to prevent 
irreparable constitutional injury at Elkton” and therefore were seeking 
“release.”81  Judge Gibbons added, however, that habeas also limited what 
types of relief were available.  While declining “to set forth a 
comprehensive list,” Judge Gibbons concluded that a transfer order would 
not be authorized under § 2241.82 
Judge Gibbons then turned to the preliminary-injunction factors and, 
specifically, to the prisoners’ likelihood of success on their Eighth 
Amendment claim.  While concluding that the objective component of the 
deliberate-indifference analysis was “easily satisfied,”83 Judge Gibbons 
concluded that the prisoners were unlikely to prevail on the subjective 
component “because, as of April 22, the BOP responded reasonably to the 
known, serious risks posed by COVID-19.”84  Judge Gibbons noted, for 
example, that the BOP “implemented a six-phase action plan to reduce 
the risk of COVID-19 spread at Elkton, . . . including screening for 
symptoms, educating staff and inmates about COVID-19, cancelling 
visitation, quarantining new inmates, implementing regular cleaning, 
providing disinfectant supplies, and providing masks.”85  Her majority 
opinion concluded that the prisoners had failed to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits and that this failure was “dispositive.”86 
 
 75.  Order Denying Motion for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-3447 (6th Cir. June 1, 2020), 
Doc. No. 46-2. 
 76.  Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D. 
Ohio June 4, 2020), D.E. 109. 
 77.  Appl. for Stay, Wilson, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (No. 19A1047) (June 1, 2020).   
 78.  Id.; Order on Appl. for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 19A1047 (June 4, 2020). 
 79.  Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 845 (6th Cir. 2020).   
 80.  Judge Gibbons was joined by Judge Cook.  Id. at 832.  Chief Judge Cole issued a separate 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 838.  
 82.  Id. at 838–39.  
 83.  Id. at 840.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. at 841.  
 86.  Id. at 844.  
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1
2021] WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT 15 
Chief Judge Cole concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that 
jurisdiction was proper under § 2241 but disagreeing that transfer was an 
inappropriate form of relief.87  Chief Judge Cole also disagreed that the 
prisoners were unable to demonstrate deliberate indifference,88 likening 
the situation to a prior Sixth Circuit case in which prison officials had 
been deemed “deliberately indifferent when they persisted in treating an 
inmate’s medical condition with medication that was known to be 
ineffective instead of an alternative that had proven to be much more 
effective in addressing the condition.”89  This “failure” was “more 
jarring” given that Congress and the Attorney General had both gone “out 
of their way to urge the BOP to take more aggressive measures to address 
the virus in its facilities.”90  
Chief Judge Cole also stated that while the phrase “‘multiphase action 
plan’ . . . sounds good on paper,” a “look behind the curtain . . . reveal[ed] 
that the BOP’s six-phase action plan” was “far less impressive than its 
title suggest[ed].”91  Ultimately, he observed, “the ‘six-phase’ plan is, for 
practical purposes, a four-phase plan where one phase is taking inventory 
of supplies and another involves the locking of inmates in 150-person 
clusters where they cannot access the principal method of COVID-19 
prevention.”92   
2. The Illinois State Prisons 
The boldest COVID-19 case likely involved Illinois state prisons.  It 
was really two cases—Money v. Pritzker93 and Money v. Jeffreys94—
though the district court resolved them together,95 so I therefore discuss 
them as one.  There, ten Illinois prisoners scattered across the State’s 
correctional facilities brought putative class actions raising both civil-
rights claims under § 1983 and habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 
federal court, all based primarily (and as relevant here) on the Eighth 
Amendment as made enforceable against the States by the Fourteenth.96  
The prisoners sought immediate injunctive relief, including—at least 
ultimately—transfer or release, and asked the district court to certify six 
separate subclasses based on medical risk factors and eligibility for 
 
 87.  Id. at 846 (Cole, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 846–47.   
 90.  Id. at 847.  
 91.  Id. at 848.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  20-cv-2093 (N.D. Ill. 2020).  
 94.  20-cv-2094 (N.D. Ill. 2020).  
 95.  See Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2020).   
 96.  Id. at 1112.  
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certain forms of relief.97  The first two subclasses alone contained nearly 
16,000 people.98 
The case did not last long in its prominent phase: filed on April 2, 
2020,99 it yielded one of the first big federal COVID-19 opinions on April 
10, 2020, when Judge Robert Dow, Jr., issued an opinion and order 
denying the preliminary relief that the prisoners sought.100  Judge Dow 
began by considering the riddle of whether a suit could seek relief under 
both § 1983 and the habeas statute.101  He observed that while habeas 
petitioners generally seek “release from custody,” the petitioners in this 
case had conceded that they were not seeking release from custody and 
were challenging “only the conditions of their confinement.”102  While 
noting a “thick and tangled web” of statutes and case law, Judge Dow 
ultimately concluded that the prisoners could go forward with their § 1983 
claims, and that it was “at least plausible—though far less certain—that 
they also ha[d] a right to seek habeas relief as well.”103 
Regarding the § 1983 claims, Judge Dow turned to the PLRA.  
Reflecting on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata104 (which 
was “the only instance” in which a federal court had ordered thousands of 
state prisoners released, and then only after a complex, 12-year 
process105), as well as subsequent litigation over COVID-19 in the 
ongoing Plata litigation and the nature of the relief sought by the Money 
prisoners, Judge Dow ultimately concluded that what they sought 
amounted to a “prisoner release order” subject to the PLRA’s 
requirements.106  “Reducing the prison population is not just a side effect 
of the case—it is the whole point,” Judge Dow reasoned.  “They want to 
remove inmates from prison because they are vulnerable in those 
facilities.”107 
Even if the PLRA did not apply, Judge Dow noted, other problems 
existed.  For one, Judge Dow doubted that class-wide relief was 
permissible.  While there were ample common questions, it was unclear 
that any of them was “likely to drive the resolution of the case.”108  Rather, 
 
 97.  Id. at 1115–16; see also id. at 1120.  
 98.  Id. at 1116.  
 99.  See Compl., Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2020) (No. 20-cv-2093), D.E. 1.  
 100.  Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1137.  
 101.  Id. at 1117–19.  
 102.  Id. at 1118.   
 103.  Id. at 1119.  
 104.  563 U.S. 493 (2011).  
 105.  Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1122.  
 106.  Id. at 1126.  
 107.  Id. at 1125.  
 108.  Id. at 1127.  To certify a class action there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  “Commonality requires at least one question common to all of the class 
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Judge Dow reasoned that the need for “individualized determinations” 
made the case a poor candidate for class adjudication.109  The 
“permutations,” he concluded, were “endless.”110 
Judge Dow also noted “serious concerns under core principles of 
federalism and the separation of powers, especially given [the prisoners’] 
request for sweeping relief in the form of a mandatory injunction.”111  
Observing that “the federal judiciary only rarely intrudes into the 
management of state prisons, and only once in history has actually 
ordered the release of prisoners on a scale anywhere near what Plaintiffs 
hope to accomplish through this litigation,”112 Judge Dow cautioned that 
while Plata indicated that relief was appropriate at least under some 
circumstances, the pace of the case cautioned against interceding.113   
Finally, Judge Dow concluded that the prisoners’ claims failed for 
lacking a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.114  While agreeing 
immediately that COVID-19 posed a serious risk to the prisoners, Judge 
Dow concluded that under the deliberate-indifference standard, the 
prisoners had “no chance of success” because the defendants had “come 
forward with a lengthy list of the actions they ha[d] taken to protect” 
Illinois prisoners.115  The defendants, Judge Dow wrote, were clearly 
“trying, very hard, to protect inmates against the virus,” and there was no 
support in the record for the assertion that they had “turned the kind of 
blind eye and deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate ‘total 
unconcern’ for the inmates’ welfare.”116   
Finally, Judge Dow dispatched the prisoners’ habeas claims, noting 
that the federal habeas statutes impose exhaustion requirements on state 
prisoners who wish to seek habeas relief from federal courts.117  Judge 
Dow noted that it was “undisputed” that the prisoners had not done so,118 
and he concluded that there were no grounds for waiving the requirement 
because the prisoners had not shown that the state court system was 
unavailable.119 
 
members, the answer to which is “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”  Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d. 
at 1127 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).  
 109.  Id. at 1128.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1128–29.   
 112.  Id. at 1129.  
 113.  Id. at 1129–30.  
 114.  Id. at 1130–33.   
 115.  Id. at 1131.   
 116.  Id. at 1132 (citation omitted).  I return below to whether this and other applications of the 
deliberate-indifference standard were consistent with Eighth Amendment doctrine as explained by the 
Supreme Court.  
 117.  Id. at 1134; see also 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)–(c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). 
 118.  Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.  
 119.  Id. at 1136.  
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3. FCI Danbury  
One of the only fully successful cases, Martinez-Brooks v. Easter120 
arose out of the COVID-19 outbreak at FCI Danbury, a low-security 
federal facility in Connecticut.121  Like Elkton, Danbury was one of the 
three federal prisons singled out by Attorney General Barr in his April 3, 
2020 memo exhorting BOP to “maximize” the use of home confinement 
in response to the outbreaks.122  On April 27, 2020, four medically 
vulnerable prisoners at Danbury brought the case as a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus under § 2241 and requested an “emergency order of 
enlargement.”123   
On May 12, 2020, Judge Michael Shea granted a temporary restraining 
order (“TRO”).  Regarding jurisdiction, Judge Shea emphasized that he 
was “not modify[ing] any sentences,” but rather ensuring that medically 
vulnerable prisoners would “receive prompt review of either a request for 
compassionate release or consideration for home confinement” under 
BOP’s existing statutory authority.124  He stated that the prisoners were 
not seeking “release” from BOP custody but that, in any event, Second 
Circuit precedent allowed bail for habeas petitioners in “extraordinary or 
exceptional circumstances” in which bail is “necessary to make the 
habeas remedy effective.”125  Citing two of the Elkton decisions to date, 
Judge Shea also found the PLRA inapplicable, observing that because the 
prisoners were claiming that their confinement at Danbury itself violated 
the Eighth Amendment and thus were seeking an order ending that 
confinement, they were engaged in a “habeas proceeding challenging ‘the 
fact . . . of confinement in prison.’”126  He also rejected BOP’s invocation 
of the Second Circuit’s exhaustion doctrine, concluding that “[g]iven the 
rapid spread of COVID-19 at FCI Danbury,” the prisoners had “shown 
that they would likely suffer irreparable harm if they were required to 
exhaust the administrative remedy process.”127 
On the merits of the TRO, Judge Shea concluded that the prisoners 
 
 120.  459 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D. Conn. 2020).  
 121.  Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 415 (D. Conn. 2020). 
 122.  See id. at 414–15; see also Barr Memo, supra note 45.  
 123.  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Martinez-Brooks, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411 (No. 3:20-cv-
00569) (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2020), D.E. 1; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text; infra Section 
III.E.  
 124.  Martinez-Brooks, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 430.  
 125.  Id. at 431 (quoting Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d. Cir. 2001)).  
 126.  Id. at 434 (“Because Petitioners contend that the Eighth Amendment violation inheres in their 
incarceration at Danbury FCI and cannot be remedied unless they are removed from that setting, 
Petitioners are challenging the fact—or ‘existence’—of their confinement.” (citing Wilson v. Williams, 
455 F.Supp.3d 467, 474–75, 480–81 (N.D. Ohio 2020); Order at 6, D.E. 23-1, Wilson v. Williams, No. 
20-3447 (6th Cir. May 4, 2020))). 
 127.  Id. at 437–38.   
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were likely to succeed in establishing an Eighth Amendment violation 
because, in addition to the substantial risk posed by COVID-19 at 
Danbury, they had shown subjective indifference in the Warden’s 
lackluster efforts “to transfer medically vulnerable prisoners . . . to home 
confinement” and poor handling of requests for compassionate release 
under § 3582(c)(1)(A).128  As Judge Shea summarized, despite the 
CARES Act’s specific authorization for home confinement and the 
Attorney General’s “exhortations,” FCI Danbury’s “implementation of 
this directive . . . ha[d] been slow and inflexible.”129  For example, the 
Respondents had been ignoring health risks in their home-confinement 
evaluations, instead “focusing on those who have served the larger 
portions of their sentences” and even “categorically disqualif[ying]” those 
who had not served at least half of their sentences.130  While the 
Government had suggested “compassionate release as an alternative,” 
that was clearly “a dead end”: while there had been 241 compassionate-
release applications filed since the pandemic began, the Warden had 
granted “exactly 0.”131 
While noting the intramural measures that the Warden had claimed to 
have implemented, Judge Shea observed that the Warden did “not dispute 
the impossibility of instituting effective social distancing measures in 
facilities, like FCI Danbury, where the vast majority of the population 
lives and sleeps in large dormitory halls lined with bunk beds, sharing 
bathroom and shower facilities.”132  Because “containment” was 
impossible without effective social distancing, home confinement was 
“the only viable measure by which the safety of highly vulnerable 
inmates” could be “reasonably assured.”133  Given the crisis, “the 
Warden’s failure to make prompter, broader use of [home confinement] 
authority to protect the lives of vulnerable inmates [wa]s likely to 
constitute deliberate indifference.”134  And the Warden’s failure to grant 
a single compassionate-release request, whether because she was setting 
“an impossible high bar” or simply “applying an obsolete one,” along 
with the languorous pace at which Danbury was processing such requests, 
further supported the same conclusion.135   
The order did not, however, require the release of any particular 
 
 128.  Id. at 440–41.  
 129.  Id. at 441.  
 130.  Id.  Similarly, “any inmate with an incident report in the past 12 months—no matter the 
seriousness—[wa]s deemed ineligible for home confinement, regardless of any health condition he or she 
might have.”  Id.   
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 443; see id. at 442.  
 133.  Id. at 443.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 445; see id. at 446.  
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prisoner; this “determination,” Judge Shea wrote, “must be 
individualized.”136  Judge Shea concluded, however, that “multi-party 
treatment” was “likely appropriate,” given that the relief being granted 
was applicable to the entire medically vulnerable subclass, multi-party 
treatment was consistent with judicial economy, and each of the Rule 
23(a) requirements weighed in favor of multi-party treatment as well.137 
Judge Shea’s TRO required the Warden to take several steps in short 
order.  First, she had to publicly identify all medically vulnerable 
prisoners within three days.138  Second, within the same time period, she 
had to “[f]inalize and implement a process that makes full and speedy use 
of” her home-confinement authority while “prioritizing” vulnerable 
prisoners and “assigning substantial weight” to COVID-19 risk factors, 
along with eliminating any factors that could lead to mandatory denials 
regardless of risk factors.139  Third, within seven days, she had to act on 
all pending compassionate-release requests from medically vulnerable 
prisoners, implement a process to ensure that future applicants would 
receive responses within the same time frame, and either update the 
relevant compassionate-release guidelines to account for COVID-19 or 
show cause as to why she should not have to do so.140  In addition, within 
13 days, she had to complete a home-confinement review and provide 
individual explanations for each denial of home confinement or 
transfer.141  
In this case, the prison officials did not appeal, and the parties over the 
summer negotiated a settlement that would allow for expanded use of 
home confinement “pursuant to the standards set forth in” the May 12, 
2020 order.142  Specifically, the parties agreed that the prison officials 
would set up a process for reviewing each medically vulnerable Danbury 
prisoner for home confinement, assigning “substantial weight” to 
COVID-19 risk factors and including a “medical clinician” in the process, 
along with transparency about the process and written explanations for 
any denials.143   
 
 136.  Id. at 447.  Judge Shea declined to require new safety measures, stating that factual disputes 
about what measures had already been implemented precluded him from concluding that the prisoners 
were likely to succeed on that part of their claim.  Id. at 449.   
 137.  Id. at 451; see id. at 452.  
 138.  Id. at 454.  
 139.  Id. at 455.  
 140.  Id. at 455–56.  
 141.  Id. at 456.  
 142.  Mem. of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Motion to Certify Settlement Class and for 
Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel at 6, D.E. 134, Whitted v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-
00569 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2020).  The case’s name changed after Dianthe Martinez-Brooks and other 
named petitioners were released.  See id. at 2 n.1.   
 143.  Id. 
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4. FCI/USP Lompoc 
The other bright spot among the federal COVID-19 habeas cases, 
Torres v. Milusnic,144 followed a similar path to the Danbury litigation.  
Lompoc,145 another federal facility—about an hour northwest of Santa 
Barbara, California, featuring both a minimum-, low-, and medium-
security facility—had a 60% infection rate when five prisoners brought 
this putative class action on May 16, 2020, seeking relief under § 2241 or 
alternatively under § 1331 for asserted Eighth Amendment violations.146  
On July 14, 2020, Judge Consuelo Marshall granted a preliminary 
injunction and provisionally certified a medically vulnerable class of 
prisoners over age 50 or with certain health conditions, ordering the 
Warden and BOP to evaluate all relevant prisoners for home confinement; 
to give “substantial weight to the inmate’s risk factors”; to update their 
compassionate-relief criteria to account for COVID-19; and to 
recommend approval or deny all compassionate-release applications 
before them.147  
On the jurisdictional question, the court cited decisions from the Elkton 
and Danbury litigation, among others, to conclude that habeas jurisdiction 
under § 2241 was proper.  “Because Petitioners contend there are no set 
of conditions of confinement that could be constitutional,” Judge 
Marshall wrote, “the Court finds Petitioners challenge the fact of their 
confinement.”148   
On the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim, the court found that the 
officials’ lackadaisical approach to home confinement and compassionate 
release created a likelihood of success on the merits.149  Judge Marshall 
observed, for example, that despite the CARES Act and the Attorney 
General’s exhortations, “[a]s of April 20, 2020, only 59 Lompoc inmates 
had been considered for home confinement and 24 inmates were 
scheduled to be released to home confinement or a Residential Reentry 
 
 144.  472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 2020). 
 145.  Because, like Elkton, the facility technically includes both FCI and USP Lompoc, see Torres 
v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (C.D. Cal. 2020), I use “Lompoc” collectively. 
 146.  Complaint and Petition at 42–46, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. CV 20-
4450), D.E. 1. 
 147.  Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 746– 47.  The court denied the prisoners’ request for a TRO 
requiring prison officials “to implement . . . specific safety measures” in light of “disputed facts.”  Id. at 
734 
 148.  Id. at 726.  The court rejected the prison officials’ PLRA argument, citing the Elkton case, in 
light of the fact that the prisoners were properly “challenging the fact of their confinement” under § 2241.  
See id. at 742.  The court also concluded that administrative exhaustion was excused because these 
remedies were “not available,” in light of prisoners having been “instructed by prison officials not to 
submit grievances and requests for compassionate release because such grievances and requests were not 
being accepted due to understaffing” and at least one petitioner showing that his compassionate-release 
request had not received a response.  Id. at 743. 
 149.  See id. at 740. 
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Center,”150 along with other evidence that the officials had “ignored . . . 
the known urgency to consider inmates for home confinement, 
particularly those most vulnerable.”151  In addition, there was “no 
evidence demonstrating consideration of Lompoc inmates’ risk factors . . 
. in evaluating requests for compassionate release, and Petitioners’ 
evidence suggest[ed] requests for compassionate release [we]re 
discouraged/not being accepted at Lompoc.”152  In sum, Judge Marshall 
concluded that the prisoners were likely to succeed on their Eighth 
Amendment claims given both the officials’ failures to use their powers 
more aggressively or demonstrate that they were taking COVID-19 risk 
into account.153 
As with the Elkton litigation, compliance with the terms of the district 
court’s order was contested.  On September 10, 2020, the prisoners moved 
for enforcement of the preliminary injunction,154 and on October 8, 2020, 
Judge Marshall granted the motion, concluding that the prison officials 
were “not making full and speedy use of their CARES Act authority in 
violation of the preliminary injunction.”155  The court ordered the Warden 
and BOP to confirm that all class members previously identified as 
approved for home confinement had actually been released and to explain 
any delays for prisoners who had not yet been released.156  The court also 
offered the officials to identify any prisoners who were denied home 
confinement and instead sent to a halfway house despite having “no 
history of violence, no sex-offense- or terrorism-related convictions” and 
lacking a high PATTERN score, as well as any prisoners denied home 
confinement in lieu of a halfway house despite having “a viable release 
plan.”157   
 
*  *     * 
 
Reading through the past four cases, one might think that the prisoners 
more or less batted .500.  In fact, the results were far more 
disappointing.158  As Professor Sharon Dolovich summarizes:  
 
 150.  Id. at 736.  
 151.  Id. at 738 (citing the Elkton and Danbury cases).  
 152.  Id. at 738–39.  
 153.  Id. at 740.  Judge Marshall also concluded that the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites, as well as 
Rule 23(b)(2), were satisfied for purposes of a provisional class certification.  See id. at 743–46.  
 154.  Notice of Motion and Motion to Enforce Compliance, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 
2020) (No. CV 20-4450), D.E. 93. 
 155.  Order Granting Motion to Enforce Compliance at 3–4, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 
2020) (No. CV 20-4450), D.E. 105. 
 156.  Id. at 5.  
 157.  Id. at 5–6.   
 158.  For other examples of defeats, see, for example, Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476 (D.N.J. 
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[T]o date, of the innumerable class actions that have been brought by 
incarcerated plaintiffs since March, only two—Martinez-Brooks v. Easter 
and Torres v. Milusnic—have yielded releases.  Each involved a single 
federal facility . . . [a]nd in each case, the number of people released has 
thus far been relatively small, 119 from Danbury and 165 from Lompoc.159 
Indeed, it seems likely that, as Dolovich observes, “by the third week of 
May, by which time a number of appellate decisions had already been 
entered and the first Supreme Court order issued in Wilson [the Elkton 
case], corrections officials would have seen enough to know which way 
the wind was blowing.”160  The Danbury and Lompoc cases built on the 
Elkton cases, and they unfolded in appellate jurisdictions (the Second and 
Ninth Circuits) where the BOP may well have judged its prospects worse 
than it did in the Sixth Circuit.   
B. Jail Cases 
Given their status as “mostly temporary waystations,” jails offered both 
higher promise and higher peril when it came to criminal defendants 
facing involuntary exposure to COVID-19.161  On the optimistic side, 
because median stays are shorter, often subject (for pretrial detainees) to 
the discretion of judges with regard to bail, and the offenses (or alleged 
offenses) involved are comparatively more likely to be minor, judges (and 
sometimes sheriffs) can more easily “take steps to shrink jail populations” 
both by restricting the pipeline of new detainees and by revisiting some 
detention decisions (for example, revisiting bail) with “relatively little 
political risk of the sort that has largely thwarted meaningful 
decarceration efforts since the ‘tough on crime’ era began.”162  Efforts 
across the country “had a notable effect”: “[b]y mid-May 2020, the 
median national jail population had dropped by 31 percent from the start 
of the pandemic.”163  Unfortunately, this trend did not last, and the 
numbers soon “began to creep back up,” with “at least 50 percent of the 
reductions” having been “erased by new admissions” as of October 1.164 
But there are dispiriting features, too.  First, transparency is especially 
limited: while prisons are no paragons on transparency, it has been 
comparatively easier to track the COVID-19 crisis unfolding there.165  
 
2020) (Fort Dix); Livas v. Myers, 455 F. Supp. 3d 272 (W.D. La. 2020) (FCI Oakdale).  
 159.  Dolovich, supra note 1, at 24 n.46.  
 160.  Id. at 24.  
 161.  Dolovich, supra note 1, at 15.  
 162.  Id. at 15–16.   
 163.  Id. at 17.   
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See UCLA LAW, COVID-19 BEHIND BARS DATA PROJECT, https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/ 
(lasted visited Oct. 22, 2021); A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT, 
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While “the biggest jail systems now publish their data on dashboards of 
the sort found on DOC websites, most jails around the country post no 
data at all.”166  Second, because average prison stays are much longer than 
average jail stays,167 we should expect people incarcerated in jails to face 
even greater danger from COVID-19 exposure (given the churn).  
Nevertheless, they may be less likely to secure counsel to bring a legal 
challenge, both because they may be less likely to reach out (whether 
because they have a higher likelihood of imminent release or because they 
are focused on a pending prosecution) and because they are concomitantly 
easier to moot out or otherwise pick off as plaintiffs.  Third, while prisons 
are generally run by the state or federal government, jails are often 
managed by cash-strapped counties and other local municipalities.168   
For all these reasons (and likely more), criminal defendants generally 
think of jail conditions as even worse than prison conditions, making it 
no surprise that the COVID-19 situation in jails was always likely to be 
bleak.  Two big federal habeas cases involving jails—Cameron v. 
Bouchard, which involved Michigan’s Oakland County Jail, and Barnes 
v. Ahlman, which involved the Orange County Jail—show a pattern of 
trial-court success followed by appellate court reversal.   
1. The Oakland County Jail 
The Oakland County Jail, in Michigan, houses over 1,600 detainees 
across three main housing units, some of which are dormitory-style and 
others of which are celled.169  “In some housing areas, inmates sleep a 
foot apart or less and, in others, inmates may have to sleep side-by-side 
in the middle of the floor. . .  All inmates, no matter where they are 
housed, share showers, toilets, sinks, brooms, and cleaning supplies.”170 
Detainees at the Oakland County Jail brought this case on April 17, 
2020, as another combination putative civil-rights class action under § 
1983 and representative habeas petition under § 2241.171  That same day, 
 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2021).  
 166.  Dolovich, supra note 1, at 28.  
 167.  “The average jail term is less than 30 days.”  Id. at 15 n.25.  The average prison term, on the 
other hand, is roughly two and a half years.  See Danielle Kaeble, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME SERVED 
IN STATE PRISON, 2016 (Nov. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf (average time 
served of 2.6 years for U.S. prisoners released in 2016).  
 168.  See Lauren-Brook Eisen, Criminal Justice Reform at the State Level, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/criminal-justice-
reform-state-level.  
 169.  Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 755–56 (E.D. Mich. 2020), vacated, Cameron v. 
Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 170.  Id. at 756.  
 171.  Id. at 753.  
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Judge Linda Parker issued a TRO directing the jail officials to improve 
sanitation and health safety at the jail and ordered them to disclose the 
names of all medically vulnerable detainees.172  On May 21, 2020, Judge 
Parker granted a preliminary injunction, requiring the jail officials to take 
further steps to slow the spread of the virus internally and to provide 
information “to enable the Court to implement a system for considering 
the release on bond or other alternatives to detention in the Jail for each 
subclass member.”173  Judge Parker wrote that “[i]n extraordinary cases 
like this, federal judges have the authority to release detainees on bail 
while their habeas petitions are pending.”174 
On May 26, 2020, the Sixth Circuit denied a stay,175 and on May 31, 
the district court “began the process for granting bail for members of the 
medically vulnerable subclass.”176  In the meantime, the Elkton litigation 
was unfolding while the Supreme Court had denied the first stay 
application on May 26, 2020.177 Justice Sotomayor had entered an 
administrative stay on June 4, 2020.178  On June 5, 2020, the Cameron 
Defendants renewed their motion for a stay with the Sixth Circuit 
“arguing that intervening changes in the law warranted a reconsideration 
of our initial denial of their motion.”179  On June 9, a majority of the 
Wilson panel vacated the Elkton preliminary injunction,180 and on June 
11, a majority of the Cameron panel granted the Cameron defendants’ 
renewed stay motion.181  On July 9, largely following the rationale of the 
Elkton decision, the Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction in 
Cameron as well.182 
Chief Judge Cole, who had also been on the Wilson panel, dissented.  
While questioning the majority’s use of Wilson—a prison case—as 
binding precedent for cases involving pretrial detainees,183 Chief Judge 
 
 172.  Id. at 753.  
 173.  Order at 6, Cameron, No. 2:20-cv-10949 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2020), D.E. 94. 
 174.  Id. at 7 (citing Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 
77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990); Savino v. Souza, 453 F.Supp.3d 441, 452–54 (D. Mass. 2020)).  
 175.  Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 20-1469, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741 (6th Cir. May 26, 2020).  
 176.  Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2020).  
 177.  Order Denying Appl. for Stay, Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1041 (May 26, 2020). 
 178.  Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1047, 2020 WL 2988458 (Mem) (June 4, 2020).  
 179.  Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 983.  
 180.  Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 181.  Cameron v. Bouchard, 818 Fed. App’x 393 (6th Cir. June 11, 2020).  Chief Judge Cole 
dissented.  
 182.  Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 983; see, e.g., id. at 985 (calling steps taken by Defendants “very 
similar to the steps taken by the officials in Wilson”); id. at 988 (“Given our decision in Wilson, a case 
that is binding on us, we agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of 
their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.”).  
 183.  Id. at 989 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).  Both the majority and the dissent avoided the lurking issue 
regarding whether the same deliberate-indifference test that applies under the Eighth Amendment should 
apply to legally innocent, pretrial detainees (whose claims are subject to Fourteenth Amendment due 
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Cole further averred that Wilson did “not stretch so far as to foreclose a 
constitutional claim based on the record” in Cameron,184 detailing 
evidence suggesting that the Defendants were “more interested . . . in 
convincing courts” that they were acting responsibly rather than actually 
“keeping the inmates in their care safe.”185  For example, he noted 
seemingly retaliatory transfers of detainees who sought to raise concerns 
and grievances, as well as changes in posted times that were suspiciously 
timed to an inspection of the jail.186  He also noted credibility 
determinations made by Judge Parker as well as the Jail’s seemingly 
“irrational allocation of resources,” such as keeping “some cells empty 
while leaving other inmates in multi-person cells”187 and seemingly 
inadequate quarantine procedures, which seemed to have exposed 
possibly infectious detainees to previously uninfected ones.188 
2. The Orange County Jail  
Another combination habeas–civil rights case, Ahlman v. Barnes, was 
filed on April 30, 2020.189  As of the prior day, “117 people in the Orange 
County Jail ha[d] tested positive for COVID-19 out of 227 people who 
were tested.”190  At that time, “there were nearly 3,000 inmates still in the 
Jail’s care, 488 of whom were medically vulnerable to COVID-19.”191 
On May 26, 2020, Judge Jesus Bernal granted partial immediate relief 
for the detainees, ordering that the Jail undertake fourteen steps to 
mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while denying a request for detainee 
releases on the ground that it was not clearly necessary (and therefore not 
further addressing the applicability of habeas relief).192  Judge Bernal 
noted that while the officials had “reduced the Jail’s population,” they had 
 
process), cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), by concluding that the result was the same 
“under the more-stringent Eighth Amendment review that all parties agree[d] applies to the claims of the 
convicted inmates at the jail.”  Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 989 (Cole, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 984–85 
(majority opinion). 
 184.  Id. at 991 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).  
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 991–92.  
 187.  Id. at 993.  
 188.  Id. at 993–94.  
 189.  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Compl., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, (C.D. 
Cal. 2020) (No. 20-cv-835), ECF No. 1.  
 190.  Id. at 1.   
 191.  Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2624 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of 
stay). 
 192.  Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 693–95, 695 n.18 (C.D. Cal. 2020).  “Because it is 
plausible that the Jail could mitigate many of the risks presented by COVID-19 with better compliance 
with the CDC Guidelines,” Judge Bernal reasoned, “Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate 
that the need for release outweighs the risks of releasing of 488 inmates without individualized 
assessments.”  Id. at 693.  
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“failed to meet the 50% target reduction rate set by” their own health 
service,193 had instituted only a partial quarantine and inadequate social 
distancing,194 and engaged in questionable testing practices, including 
allowing detainees “awaiting the outcome of a COVID-19 test . . . to 
return to the general population.”195  He concluded that their compliance 
with CDC guidelines had “been piecemeal and inadequate,” noting that it 
was “belied by the fact that there [were by then] 369 confirmed COVID-
19 cases in the Jail—up from only 26 confirmed cases less than a month” 
before.196   
Judge Bernal also suggested that “the CDC Guidelines represent the 
floor, not the ceiling, of an adequate response” at a facility with so many 
cases.197  “As the rate of infection rises,” he wrote, “so must the required 
response.”198  Judge Bernal described the need for a sliding scale: “one 
bar of soap a week may not be deliberately indifferent where there are no 
infections but it certainly is where—as here—there are hundreds of 
infected individuals with new cases daily.”199 
On June 12, 2020, the Ninth Circuit denied a stay of the preliminary 
injunction while issuing a limited remand for the district court to consider 
whether “changed circumstances . . . might merit modification or 
dissolution of the preliminary injunction.”200  On June 26, 2020, the 
district court denied the Defendants’ application to dissolve the 
injunction,201 and on June 29, the Ninth Circuit denied a further stay 
 
 193.  Id. at 680.  
 194.  Id. at 681.  
 195.  Id. at 682.  
 196.  Id. at 688-89.  Judge Bernal observed that this meant that “[a]n individual incarcerated at the 
Jail [wa]s nearly one hundred times more likely to get COVID-19 than the average resident of Orange 
County.”  Id.  
 197.  Id. at 691.   
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18677, at *2 (9th Cir. June 12, 
2020).  The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on June 17, 2020, expanding on the June 12 order.  See 
Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20801, at *2 & n.1 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020).  
The court of appeals largely relied on the District Court’s factual findings, subject to clear-error review, 
noting that “[o]n those facts, which portrayed a response that fell well short of the CDC guidelines and 
resulted in an explosion of COVID-19 cases in the jail.”  Id. at *9.  The court also noted that the jail 
officials’ arguments on appeal were “diametrically opposed to their litigation position in the district 
court,” where they had claimed that they had “already implemented” the “measures requested by Plaintiffs 
(and later incorporated into the injunction),” a paradox that doomed their irreparable-injury claims.  Id. at 
*7–8.  Judge Ryan Nelson concurred in part and dissented in part, asserting that the majority was 
“adopt[ing] an unprecedented interpretation” of the Constitution by allowing the district court to order the 
jail to go beyond the CDC’s Interim Guidance.  Id. at *12–13.  
 201.  Order (1) Denying Defs. Ex Parte Appl. to Dissolve Inj.; (2) Granting Pls.’ Mot. For Expedited 
Disc.; (3) Den. Pls.’ Appl. To Shorten Time; and (4) Vacating the July 20, 2020 Hearing, Ahlman, v. 
Barnes,  2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223677 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (No. 20-cv-835), No. 93. 
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application.202   
On August 5, 2020, by a 5–4 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
a stay of the preliminary injunction.203  Justices Breyer and Kagan noted 
their dissents, and Justice Sotomayor issued an opinion, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, dissenting from the grant of the stay.  In her dissent, Justice 
Sotomayor noted that while the Jail had “voluntarily released 53 percent” 
of its detainees and “claim[ed] that it had largely implemented the CDC 
Guidelines and radically increased hygiene and cleaning within its walls, 
the District Court, whose factual findings are owed deference, found the 
reality to be very different.”204  And as she noted in response to the Jail’s 
claim that the preliminary injunction went beyond CDC Guidelines, the 
Jail had cited “just two alleged discrepancies: first, that the District Court 
ordered the Jail to provide adequate spacing of six feet or more between 
incarcerated people, whereas the CDC Guidelines suggest only that six 
feet of space is ‘ideal[]’; and second, that the injunction requires daily 
temperature checks and screening questions.”205   
C. Non-Habeas Cases 
Not all federal COVID-19 cases sought release; some plaintiffs brought 
standard civil-rights claims seeking intramural improvements in prison 
conditions instead or as well.  Some of these cases nevertheless generated 
significant rulings (generally negative for prisoners) regarding the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment in the context of COVID-19, thereby 
impacting cases proceeding under the habeas theory.  Below, I discuss 
two such cases: one involving a Texas geriatric prison, and one involving 
a Miami-Dade County jail. 
1. Texas’s “Pack Unit”  
The Valentine v. Collier litigation concerned the “Pack Unit,” “a 
geriatric prison in southeast Texas that has been ravaged by COVID-
19.”206  This § 1983 putative class action was filed on March 30, 2020, 
raising Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 claims.207   
 
 202.  Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20300 (9th Cir. June 29, 2020). 
 203.  Barnes, 140 S.Ct. at 2620. 
 204.  Id. at 2622 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay).  
 205.  Id. at 2623 (alteration in original).  
 206.  Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 57 (Nov. 16, 2020) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from 
denial of application to vacate stay).   
 207.  Compl. and Application at 28-31, Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020) 
(No. 20-cv-1115), ECF No. 1.  Many other COVID-19 cases also raised ADA claims.  See, e.g., Garrett 
& Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 19, 32.  Those claims are important, but outside the scope of this Article.  
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On April 16, 2020, Judge Keith Ellison entered a preliminary 
injunction, requiring officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
(TDCJ) to take a number of steps to reduce the spread of COVID-19 
within the Pack Unit.208  In a memorandum opinion filed a few days later, 
Judge Ellison noted that the prison had “refused to give inmates alcohol-
based hand sanitizer or disposable paper towels,”209 had insufficiently 
communicated information on how to protect against transmission of 
COVID-19,210 had engaged in very limited testing (64 prisoners out of 
1,248 at the time of the injunction),211 and was unable to provide for 
adequate social distancing.212 He concluded that exhaustion should be 
excused “[i]n light of the alarming speed” of COVID-19213 and the 
prison’s “lengthy administrative procedure, which TDCJ may choose to 
extend at will.”214   
On the Eighth Amendment question, Judge Ellison found that the 
TDCJ actions fell “short of their own policy” and did “not reasonably 
abate the extremely high risk facing the inmates in Pack Unit.”215  To the 
extent his order demanded something more than TDCJ and CDC policies 
required, Judge Ellison explained, it did so “with great care and out of 
great necessity.”216 
On April 22, 2020, in a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
preliminary injunction.217  The majority of the panel concluded that the 
prison officials were likely to prevail for two reasons relating to the 
Eighth Amendment question.218  First, while the COVID-19 risk was real, 
the panel stated that the district court had “acknowledged that the ‘extra 
measures’ it required ‘go[] beyond TDCJ and CDC policies,’” whereas 
the prisoners had “cited no precedent holding that the CDC’s 
recommendations are insufficient.”219  Second, the prisoners had shown 
insufficient evidence of TDCJ’s subjective deliberate indifference to 
 
 208.  Preliminary Injunction Order, Valentine, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 20-cv-
1115), ECF No. 40.   
 209.  Memorandum and Order at 10, Valentine, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 20-cv-
1115), ECF No. 51.  
 210.  Id. at 11–12.  
 211.  See id. at 7, 12. 
 212.  Id. at 12–13.  
 213.  Id. at 16.  
 214.  Id. at 17.  
 215.  Id. at 21.  
 216.  Id. at 25.  
 217.  Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 2020).  Judge Higginson concurred in the 
judgment.  
 218.  Id. at 801.  
 219.  Id. at 802.  In addition, the panel noted, the District Court could not enjoin the State “to follow 
its own laws and procedures.”  Id. at 802; see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89 (1984).  
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satisfy the test for an Eighth Amendment claim.220  On the other stay 
factors, the court likewise sided with TDCJ, concluding that the order 
“created ‘an administrative nightmare’ for TDCJ” and that this “harm” 
was “particularly acute because the district court’s order interferes with 
the rapidly changing and flexible system-wide approach that TDCJ has 
used to respond to the pandemic so far.”221  Nor, the court reasoned, had 
the prisoners demonstrated that they would “suffer irreparable injuries 
even after accounting for the protective measures” that TDCJ was 
taking.222  The majority added that the prisoners “appear[ed]” to face 
PLRA problems both in terms of a failure to exhaust available remedies 
and the breadth of the district court’s order.223 
On May 14, 2020, the Supreme Court denied an application to vacate 
the stay,224 and on June 5, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary 
injunction.225  On September 29, 2020, following an eighteen-day trial, 
Judge Ellison entered a permanent injunction, requiring TDCJ to 
undertake a list of 17 obligations similar to those in the preliminary 
injunction.226   
On October 13, 2020, a new panel of the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
permanent injunction.227  While acknowledging that the grievance process 
was “[b]y all accounts . . .  suboptimal,” the court concluded, first, that 
the procedure was nevertheless “available,” and thus that the prisoners 
were required to exhaust.228  Because there was no “‘special 
circumstances’ exception” in the PLRA, the panel reasoned, “even threats 
posed by global pandemics” did “not matter.”229   
 
 220.  Valentine, 956 F.3d at 802.  
 221.  Id. at 803; see id. at 804.  
 222.  Id. at 804.  
 223.  See id. at 805–06.  Judge Higginson based his concurrence in the judgment on the exhaustion 
point, noting that the court’s opinion did “not foreclose the possibility that, upon expedited consideration, 
our court may nonetheless conclude that a remedy using the [TDCJ] grievance system is not ‘available’ 
because of the immediacy of the COVID-19 medical emergency coupled with statements credited by the 
district court that prisoners’ grievances may not be addressed promptly.”  Id. at 806 (Higginson, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 224.  Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598 (2020).  Justice Sotomayor filed a statement respecting 
the denial, joined by Justice Ginsburg, “to highlight the disturbing allegations presented below” and to 
note that “where plaintiffs demonstrate that a prison grievance system cannot or will not respond to an 
inmate’s complaint, they could well satisfy an exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.”  Id. 
(statement of Sotomayor, J.). 
 225.  Valentine v. Collier, 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020).  Judge Davis “reluctantly concur[red] 
in the judgment . . . because conditions ha[d] dramatically changed in the prison since the preliminary 
injunction issued.”  Id. (Davis, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 226.  Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1175 (S.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d, 993 F.3d 270 (5th 
Cir. 2021). 
 227.  Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 228.  Id. at 161–62.  
 229.  Id. at 161; see also id. (“The district court made much of TDCJ’s ‘acknowledgment that the 
existing grievance process was inadequate in light of COVID-19 and the implementation of a new set of 
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“But even if Plaintiffs could surmount the PLRA,” the panel 
concluded, “their Eighth Amendment claim” was likely to fail given the 
“affirmative steps” TDCJ had taken.230  The panel acknowledged several 
TDCJ omissions: it had “failed to enforce social distancing in the Pack 
Unit, particularly in the showers”; it “did not increase the janitorial staff’s 
access to training or supplies”; its “staff regularly violated the mask 
policy”; sanitation and mask-wearing were substandard in the prison 
laundry; there was a lack of hand sanitizer and working sinks; there was 
no contact-tracing plan; and the testing “turnaround time . . . was between 
one and two weeks at the start of the pandemic.”231  Still, the panel 
concluded that Judge Ellison had “held TDCJ to a higher standard than 
the Constitution imposes” and that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not 
enact the CDC guidelines.”232  “To be sure,” the panel wrote, “the district 
court identified lapses in TDCJ’s response to COVID-19.  As a matter of 
policy, TDCJ could have done more to protect vulnerable inmates in the 
Pack Unit.  But federal judges are not policymakers.”233   
On November 16, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court denied an application 
to vacate the stay.234  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, 
dissented.235  She noted that “[g]iven the speed at which the contagion 
spread, the 160-day grievance process offered no realistic prospect of 
relief.”236  She also wrote that the “the Fifth Circuit’s analysis makes clear 
that it substituted its own view of the facts for that of the District Court” 
on the Eighth Amendment question.237 Further,  she  highlighted a few 
facts that had come out at trial, such as the fact that one prisoner had been 
transferred immediately after 14 days elapsed even though he was still 
symptomatic,238 and that one warden “was not concerned about assigning 
cleaning duties” to wheelchair-bound prisoners “because a disabled 
inmate ‘could put a broom against his neck and push it with a 
wheelchair.’”239  
On March 26, 2021, the Fifth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction, 
reversed the district court’s judgment, and entered judgment for the state 
defendants.240  All three judges on the panel concluded that the 
 
procedures.’  But inadequate is not a synonym for unavailable.” (citation omitted)). 
 230.  Id. at 162–64.   
 231.  Id. at 164.  
 232.  Id.  
 233.  Id. at 165.  
 234.  Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57 (2020) (mem.).  
 235.  Id.  
 236.  Id. at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).   
 237.  Id. at 61.  
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 59.  
 240.  Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 277, 291 (5th Cir. 2021). 
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defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 
violation, with the majority ultimately concluding, essentially, that the 
defendants could not be said to have violated the Eighth Amendment for 
having done “their best.”241 
2. Miami-Dade’s Metro West Detention Center 
Another combination habeas–civil rights putative class action, Swain 
v. Junior, was filed on April 5, 2020, following a COVID-19 outbreak at 
a Miami-Dade County jail.242  Judge Kathleen Williams entered a TRO 
two days later.243  On April 29, Judge Williams granted the plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction in part, ordering the defendants to 
take specific steps at the Metro West Detention Center to increase 
detainee safety, including providing for social distancing and imposing 
reporting requirements.244  Presumably because Judge Williams denied 
relief under § 2241, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent,245 the case evolved 
as a § 1983 case. 
On May 5, 2020, a motions panel of the Eleventh Circuit stayed the 
preliminary injunction.246  The majority wrote that Judge Williams had 
“incorrectly collapsed the subjective and objective components” of the 
Eighth Amendment test, “treat[ing] the increase in COVID-19 infections 
as proof that the defendants deliberately disregarded an intolerable 
risk.”247  The majority also relied on an expert report ordered by Judge 
Williams for the proposition that the jail officials were “doing their best” 
and had “implemented many measures to curb the spread of the virus.”248  
In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, the majority also 
concluded that the other factors weighed in the jail officials’ favor, 
including that they would “be irreparably injured absent a stay” because 
they would “lose the discretion vested in them under state law to allocate 
scarce resources.”249  The majority added that the district court had also 
“likely erred” in failing to address exhaustion under the PLRA.250 
 
 241.  See id. at 289 n.38 (quoting Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020)).  Judge 
Oldham concurred in the judgment, chiding the majority for including positive dicta about the district 
judge’s handling of the case.   Id. at 291–95.  
 242.  Petition and Complaint, Swain v. Junior, No. 20-cv-21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2020), D.E. 1.   
 243.  Order, Swain, No. 20-cv-21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2020), D.E. 25.  
 244.  Swain v. Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1317–18 (S.D. Fla. 2020), vacated, 961 F.3d 1276.  
At the time, at least 163 detainees and 17 staff members had been infected.  Id. 1292.  
 245.  See id. at 1314–17; see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1086 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 246.  Swain, 958 F.3d at 1085.  
 247.  Id. at 1089.  
 248.  Id. (citation omitted).   
 249.  Id. at 1090; see id. at 1091.  
 250.  Swain, 958 F.3d at 1091–92.  Judge Wilson dissented.  Id. at 1092–93.  
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On June 15, 2020, a merits panel of the Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
preliminary injunction.251  The majority noted that the jail officials “had 
purchased and installed ionizers to purify the air and body-heat cameras 
to measure inmates’ temperatures, . . . had begun testing even 
asymptomatic inmates,” had released “nearly 900 inmates” (bringing the 
population “to less than 70% of its capacity”), and “would continue 
working to reduce the inmate population.”252  Nevertheless, the majority 
acknowledged that, per the detainees, it was still “difficult or impossible 
to distance from other inmates in certain spaces or during certain times of 
the day.”253   
The majority observed that the district court’s order had focused on 
“the fact that COVID-19 was continuing to spread” and “the impossibility 
of achieving adequate social distancing.”254  This was an error, the 
majority stated, because neither of these factors, in its view, established 
Eighth Amendment subjective indifference.255  “Failing to do the 
‘impossible’ doesn’t evince indifference,” the majority wrote, “let alone 
deliberate indifference.”256  Indeed, it observed, the jail officials had taken 
“numerous other measures—besides social distancing—to mitigate the 
spread of the virus.”257  The majority added that the district court erred in 
failing to address PLRA exhaustion258 and in applying the other three 
preliminary-injunction factors.259 
In her dissent, Judge Beverly Martin found no evidence of an abuse of 
discretion by the district court, as the record demonstrated that the 
defendants had “knowingly maintained conditions” that created “an 
impermissibly high risk of illness and death” both “by maintaining a 
dangerously high jail population” and “by failing to implement needed 
safety measures.”260  Despite being aware of the risks, Judge Martin 
wrote, they “continued to detain significantly more people than Metro 
West can safely hold during this pandemic,” making detainees “much 
 
 251.  Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020).  Judge Beverly Martin dissented.  Id. 
at 1294.  
 252.  Id. at 1282.  
 253.  Id. at 1283.  
 254.  Id. at 1286.  
 255.  Id. at 1287.  
 256.  Id.  
 257.  Id. at 1289.  
 258.  Id. at 1291.  
 259.  Id. at 1292–94.  The majority chided the District Court for failing to make findings regarding 
whether the detainees would suffer irreparable injury even in the absence of the preliminary injunction 
given the steps that the jail officials were already taking.  Id. at 1292–93.  It also concluded that the District 
Court had given “insufficient consideration to the burdens with which the injunction would saddle the 
defendants.”  Id. at 1293.  
 260.  Id. at 1296 (Martin, J., dissenting).  
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more likely to contract COVID-19.”261  Their “knowing failure,” she 
argued, “sits comfortably at the heart of what our Court considers to be 
deliberate indifference.”262 
D. The Overall Timeline 
What did this progression look like in aggregate?  I have arranged the 
key milestones below, highlighting victories (or what were primarily 
victories) for incarcerated people in green and defeats (or what were 






 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. at 1296–97 (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 
1985)).  
Date Case Court Event 
3/30/2020 Valentine S.D. Tex. Case filed 
4/2/2020 Money N.D. Ill. Case filed 
4/5/2020 Swain S.D. Fla. Case filed 
4/7/2020 Swain S.D. Fla. TRO granted 
4/10/2020 Money N.D. Ill. PI denied 
4/13/2020 Wilson N.D. Ohio Case filed 
4/16/2020 Valentine S.D. Tex. PI granted 
4/17/2020 Cameron E.D. Mich. Case filed 
4/17/2020 Cameron E.D. Mich. TRO granted 
4/21/2020 Cameron E.D. Mich. PI granted 
4/22/2020 Wilson N.D. Ohio PI granted 
4/22/2020 Valentine 5th Cir. PI stayed 
4/27/2020 Martinez-Brooks D. Conn. Case filed 
4/29/2020 Swain S.D. Fla. PI granted 
4/30/2020 Ahlman C.D. Cal. Case filed 
5/4/2020 Wilson 6th Cir. Stay application denied 
5/11/2020 Swain 11th Cir. PI stayed 
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Figure 1. Developments in Key COVID-19 Cases 
 
As this table shows, these cases progressed (generally speaking) from 
early success in the lower courts to failure on appeal, beginning in May 
and early June of 2020.  If we look at the progression of COVID-19 deaths 
over roughly the same period,263 we see that the judicial tide started to 
turn around the same time as COVID-19 deaths nationally were beginning 
to bottom out from the first wave.264  Correlation is not causation, of 
 
 263.  The COVID Tracking Project, THE ATLANTIC, https://covidtracking.com/data/download (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2020). 
 264.  I use deaths rather than positive infections given both the slow speed at which testing ramped 
up and the greater salience of this figure for the stakes involved.   
 
5/12/2020 Martinez-Brooks D. Conn. TRO granted 
5/14/2020 Valentine Sup. Ct.  
     Application to vacate stay       
     denied 
5/16/2020 Torres C.D. Cal. Case filed 
5/19/2020 Wilson N.D. Ohio Motion to enforce granted 
5/26/2020 Wilson Sup. Ct.  Stay application denied 
5/26/2020 Cameron 6th Cir. Stay application denied 
5/26/2020 Ahlman C.D. Cal. PI granted 
6/1/2020 Wilson 6th Cir. 
     Renewed stay application  
     denied 
6/4/2020 Wilson Sup. Ct.  Administrative stay 
6/9/2020 Wilson 6th Cir. PI vacated 
6/11/2020 Cameron 6th Cir. 
Renewed stay application  
    granted 
6/12/2020 Ahlman 9th Cir. 
Stay application denied;  
    limited remand 
6/15/2020 Swain 11th Cir. PI vacated 
6/26/2020 Ahlman C.D. Cal. 
Application to dissolve PI  
    denied 
6/29/2020 Ahlman 9th Cir. Stay application denied 
7/9/2020 Cameron 6th Cir. PI vacated 
7/14/2020 Torres C.D. Cal. PI granted 
8/5/2020 Ahlman Sup. Ct.  PI stayed 
9/29/2020 Valentine S.D. Tex. Permanent injunction entered 
10/8/2020 Torres C.D. Cal. Motion to enforce granted 
10/13/2020 Valentine 5th Cir. Permanent injunction stayed 
11/16/2020 Valentine Sup. Ct.  
Application to vacate stay  
    denied 
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course, and the cases themselves involved significant doctrinal questions 
on which judges could disagree.  This Article turns to those doctrinal 
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III. KEY TENSIONS IN THE COVID-19 CASES 
The major COVID-19 prison and jail cases have a few key things in 
common: they all brought Eighth Amendment claims (and almost all 
brought partial habeas claims) to address assertedly unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement through class-wide (or otherwise 
representative) litigation in federal court.  In some instances, the alleged 
violations were in state facilities, while in others, the facilities were 
federal.  In the most successful of these time-sensitive cases, litigants and 
courts wrestled with what appropriate preliminary relief would look like 
while litigation proceeded.  The progression of these cases as a whole 
reflects larger tensions between rights and remedies, not only in the 
context of the American carceral state, but also in federal court litigation 
over asserted constitutional harms more broadly.   
This Part discusses a series of related doctrinal tensions that sometimes 
act as stumbling blocks for courts and litigants: (A) whether these suits 
could be brought in habeas; (B) the scope of Eight Amendment 
“deliberate indifference” doctrine in this context; (C) the availability of 
class-wide relief; (D) federalism and comity concerns, and how those 
concerns may have been sourced through exhaustion doctrine; (E) 
questions of whether temporary release could be ordered as a form of 
preliminary rather than final relief; and (F) the interplay between rights 
and remedies.   
A. Habeas, Conditions of Confinement, and the PLRA  
AEDPA makes a steep road for any prisoner—and especially any state 
prisoner—seeking to claim that he was convicted or sentenced in 
violation of federal law.265  But what about a prisoner whose claim has 
nothing to do with the legality of his conviction or sentence, but who 
instead—like the hypothetical prisoner in the Introduction whose prison 
is falling into a sinkhole—asserts that while his sentence may be justified, 
serving it in this particular prison under the current conditions itself 
violates federal law?  That prisoner, whether state or federal, is certainly 
not bringing a traditional habeas claim under § 2254 or § 2255.  At the 
same time, however, that prisoner is still arguing that there is something 
unlawful about his current detention.   
The initial complexity of these novel arguments arises from the 
prisoner claiming the conditions of his confinement make his detention 
illegal.  This alone is common.  Take, for example, a prisoner who claims 
that his current confinement exposes him to dangerous levels of second-
 
 265.  See supra Section I.A. 
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hand tobacco smoke, “jeopardizing his health” in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.266  This prisoner is asserting that his current detention is 
unlawful to the extent that it imposes this harm on him.267  Yet no one 
assumes that the remedy for this state of affairs is “release . . . from 
custody.”268   
The answer in that situation, if the challenged condition is in fact 
unlawful, is instead to require the prison to remedy that condition—for 
example, through an injunction requiring prison officials to protect 
unwilling prisoners from second-hand smoke.269  State prisoners 
challenging these and other kinds of internally remediable conditions 
generally bring such claims under § 1983.270  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly reserved the question of whether such mine-run conditions-of-
confinement claims can be brought via habeas271 while the circuit courts 
have split on this issue.272 Even the circuits that have ruled against 
prisoners, however, may not have encountered a situation in which 
assertedly unconstitutional conditions cannot practically be remedied 
inside the prison walls.273  COVID-19, like the sinking-prison 
 
 266.  E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993).  
 267.  See id. 
 268.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  
 269.  See, e.g., Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 35.  
 270.  Federal prisoners cannot bring such claims under § 1983 because federal prison wardens are 
not acting “under color of” state law.  Nevertheless, they can potentially seek injunctive and declaratory 
relief under the Eighth Amendment directly via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, given that asserted Eighth Amendment 
violations in federal prisons necessarily raise federal questions.  Section 1331, after all, provides for 
federal district courts to have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States.”  And federal courts have long been recognized to have the authority to 
enjoin unconstitutional acts by federal (and state) officials.  See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–91 (1949) (federal); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 
619–21 (1912) (federal); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state); Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824) (state); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) 
(noting that plaintiffs were “challeng[ing] large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of 
confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners” and that, “[t]o address those kinds of decisions, detainees 
may seek injunctive relief”).  The Eighth Amendment has also been held to provide an implied damages 
remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), see Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14, 17 (1980), these kinds of claims are increasingly difficult to bring successfully, see Abbasi, 
137 S.Ct. at 1854–63.  
 271.  See Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1862–63; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979); Preiser, 411 
U.S. at 499.  But see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484, 490 (1969); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 
249, 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).  
 272.  See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); see also 
Order on Pls. Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 46, Swain v. Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1287 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 
2020) (No. 20-cv-21457), D.E. 100 (noting split).  
 273.  Compare, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his Court 
has held that even if a prisoner proves an allegation of mistreatment in prison that amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment, he is not entitled to release.  The appropriate Eleventh Circuit relief from prison 
conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment during legal incarceration is to require the discontinuance 
of any improper practices, or to require correction of any condition causing cruel and unusual 
punishment.” (citations omitted)), with Order on Pls. Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 46–47, Swain v. Junior, 
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hypothetical, makes that problem concrete.   
For prisoners such as those in the hypothetical sinking prison, bringing 
a claim under § 1983 (or directly under the Eighth Amendment via § 1331 
jurisdiction) carries a special pitfall: the PLRA.  As noted above, the 
PLRA limits “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison 
conditions”274 in multiple ways.275  Habeas offers a potential pathway 
around this problem because the PLRA expressly excludes “habeas 
corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in 
prison.”276   
A prisoner who sues his prison asking for better cleaning supplies does 
not challenge “the fact or duration of [his] confinement,” but a prisoner 
who brings a habeas claim alleging that he cannot constitutionally be 
confined in a given facility (for example, in the COVID-19 or sinkhole 
scenario) arguably does.  This prisoner levels an attack that is “just as 
close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s 
conviction, for it goes directly to the constitutionality of his physical 
confinement itself and seeks either immediate release from that 
confinement or the shortening of its duration.”277  From this perspective, 
seeking relief via habeas corpus (rather than a civil-rights action) is more 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance on the proper remedial 
channels.278 
One may counter that because the prisoner will likely have to concede 
that he can constitutionally be confined somewhere—for example, a 
prison that is not sinking into the ground and rapidly filling with water—
he is seeking neither immediate release from all custody nor the 
shortening of his sentence.  From this perspective, the prisoner is really 
just quarreling with the conditions of his confinement—a question that 
some courts doubt can be considered in habeas at all.279  Such claims have 
been characterized by some as “Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement 
 
457 F. Supp. 3d 1287 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-21457), D.E. 100 (noting that Gomez “left 
open the question of whether habeas would be available in a context where there was no constitutional 
manner of continued confinement” and observing that other courts have suggested that this is an 
appropriate reading). 
 274.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).  
 275.  See supra Section I.B.  
 276.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).  
 277.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).; cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 
1863 (2017) (noting that “[a] successful habeas petition would have required [federal] officials to place 
[a putative class of hundreds] in less-restrictive conditions immediately” without suggesting any of kind 
of PLRA problem). 
 278.  See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490 (“Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate 
remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific 
determination must override the general terms of § 1983.”).  
 279.  E.g., Rice v. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021). 
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litigation in disguise,”280 and there is a circuit split over whether habeas 
relief is available to prisoners who raise such  conditions-related 
claims.281  This counterargument sets up a Scylla and Charybdis: go the 
civil-rights route and face the PLRA; go the habeas route and get told that 
you’re not really challenging your confinement and that you’re not 
allowed to raise these kinds of arguments in habeas in the first place.  
The natural reply to at least the first problem—the assertion that the 
prisoner is not really challenging his confinement, but rather quibbling 
over conditions—is that the habeas claims prisoners brought during the 
pandemic were different from classic conditions-of-confinement cases in 
a crucial way: they could be remedied only with the standard habeas 
remedy of release from present confinement, whereas classic conditions 
claims can be resolved with realistic intramural reforms.282 
This answer to the counterargument was essentially the theory that the 
Sixth Circuit adopted in Wilson—the subsidiary victory that the prisoners 
won there.  The majority observed that while the BOP had sought to cast 
the case as a classic conditions-of-confinement challenge, the prisoners 
were not “arguing that there are particular procedures or safeguards that 
the BOP should put in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19 
throughout Elkton.”283 Instead, they were claiming “that there were no 
conditions of confinement sufficient to prevent irreparable constitutional 
injury at Elkton.”284  In other words, they sought “release,” and circuit 
precedent confirmed that “where a petitioner claims that no set of 
conditions would be constitutionally sufficient the claim should be 
construed as challenging the fact or extent, rather than the conditions, of 
the confinement.”285 
Mathematically, this logic makes sense.  Even if a prisoner’s right is to 
release from only one specific island in the carceral archipelago, that 
 
 280.  Cf. Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 80.  
 281.  See Rice, 985 F.3d at 1070 n.2 (acknowledging split with Sixth Circuit’s decision in Wilson); 
see also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 27 & n.171.   
 282.  I use the word “realistic” because, in theory, prison officials can solve any problem with 
enough time, money, and technological advancement.  But if the only way to solve the problem is to turn 
back time, invent a vaccine, or build a new prison, prisoners have a much better argument that those are 
not real-world “conditions” that prison officials can realistically fix.  On the other hand, if the entire 
problem is remediable with more cleaning supplies, prison officials can presumably defeat habeas 
jurisdiction by noting the availability of cleaning supplies.  (They might expose themselves to civil-rights 
liability if they failed to do so, but not to a habeas issue.)   
 283.  Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 284.  Id. at 838. 
 285.  Id.; accord id. at 846 (Cole, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Martinez-
Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 433–34 (D. Conn. 2020) (“The Petitioners in this case are 
challenging the conditions of their confinement but they are also challenging the ‘fact . . . of confinement 
in prison.’ . . . In short, Petitioners contend that the fact of their confinement in prison itself amounts to 
an Eighth Amendment violation under these circumstances, and nothing short of an order ending their 
confinement at FCI Danbury will alleviate that violation.”).  
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constitutes a decrease (even if a small one) in the government’s overall 
power to confine him.  Decreasing the number of facilities where a 
government may permissibly incarcerate a person from 100 to 99 is a 
“quantum change in the level of custody,”286 just as the phrases “you can 
hold him anywhere” and “you may be able to hold him elsewhere but you 
can’t hold him there” are not equivalent statements.  In the COVID-19 
cases, like the sinkhole scenario, the “condition” that violates the Eighth 
Amendment is the condition of being held in that particular prison, pure 
and simple.  The only solution is release from that prison—a classic 
habeas remedy, in other words. 
The focus on that specific remedy accounts at least for why these kinds 
of claims properly challenge the “fact or duration of confinement” for 
purposes of the PLRA.287  But what about circuits where it is blackletter 
law that conditions-of-confinement claims cannot be brought via 
habeas?288  An answer to this secondary question is that cases like the 
COVID-19 cases are not conditions-of-confinement cases “in disguise” 
at all.  Rather, they also qualify as fact-or-duration challenges in an 
overlapping sense—the sense that the Supreme Court employed when it 
wrote in Preiser that “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state 
prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, 
and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 
1983.”289  Specifically, COVID-19 habeas claims should be understood 
as falling under two established (if not universally accepted) classes of 
habeas claims, both of which arise under § 2241: (1) challenges to the 
execution or manner of a sentence or (2) challenges to a place of 
confinement.  
With regard to the first class of habeas claims, many federal circuits 
recognize that § 2241 may be used to challenge “the execution or manner 
in which [a] sentence is served.”290  Some (relatively) noncontroversial 
challenges falling under this rubric include the computation of a 
prisoner’s sentence or good-time credits or the way that a prison system 
 
 286.  Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v. 
Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 287.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).  
 288.  See Rice v. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021); McIntosh v. United States Parole 
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991); cf. 
Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006).  
 289.  Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). 
 290.  United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001); see Woodall v. Fed. Bur. of 
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2005); Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(including conditions); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Campbell, 
204 F.3d 861, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2000) (also allowing “conditions” claims); cf. United States v. Mares, 868 
F.2d 151, 151 (5th Cir. 1989).  But cf. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The 
difference between a claim of entitlement to be released, and an opportunity to be considered for release, 
also affects the choice between § 2241 and a mundane civil action.”).   
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runs the parole or disciplinary process.291  Because they implicate how 
long a person must be in prison, these examples suggest that execution-
or-manner claims are largely a subset of fact-or-duration claims.  That 
said, some courts have understood them to encompass claims that do not 
directly impact the fact or duration of a prison sentence as well.292  Here, 
as previously discussed, COVID-19 claims would implicate the fact or 
duration of confinement.  
As for the second category, prisoners in the COVID-19 (or sinkhole) 
context might also cast their claims as place-of-confinement suits.  Such 
claims have a long vintage—in the 1890s, the Supreme Court addressed 
two such cases, the more commonly cited of which is In re Bonner.293  In 
that case, the petitioner, John Bonner, was imprisoned in a state 
penitentiary in Iowa.294  He had been convicted of violating a federal law 
that authorized as punishment no more than a $1,000 fine and “one year” 
in prison.295  The problem was that separate federal laws provided for 
imprisonment in a state penitentiary only when the person was convicted 
of a federal crime and “sentenced to imprisonment for a period longer 
than one year” or “at hard labor.”296  “It follow[ed] that the court had no 
jurisdiction to” imprison Bonner in a state penitentiary “when the 
imprisonment [wa]s not ordered for a period longer than one year or at 
 
 291.  E.g., Thompson, 525 F.3d at 209; Mares, 868 F.2d at 151; Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 
442, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (parole procedures); Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013) (good-
time credits); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88 (challenge to good-time credits proper only under 
habeas, not § 1983).  
 292.  E.g., Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864–65; Thompson, 525 F.3d at 209; Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 
F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013).  The one area where these types of claims are likely be unavailable in 
habeas is when they seek to challenge a method of capital punishment (or “execution” in a different sense 
of the word).  See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 879 (2015) (stating that a previous case, Hill v. 
McDonough, “held that a method-of-execution claim must be brought under § 1983 because such a claim 
does not attack the validity of the prisoner’s conviction or death sentence”).  But see Hill v. McDonough, 
547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006) (“The question before us is whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an action 
for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or whether it may 
proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (emphasis added)); id. at 579; Nelson v. Campbell, 
541 U.S. 637, 639-640, 643–646 (2004).  While some courts have taken this logic to foreclose even 
method-of-execution suits via habeas that would render the prisoner’s death sentence unconstitutional, 
see In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454, 465–66 (6th Cir. 2017), there is no reason that this rule should apply 
outside of the capital-punishment context, given that the motivating rationale was the Glossip Court’s 
death-penalty specific concern “that a state could be left without any lawful means of execution,” id. at 
462; see also Glossip, 576 U.S. at 880–81.  Prisoners bringing § 2241 claims in light of COVID-19 are 
not similarly situated, as there is no likelihood that that their claims could render incarceration de facto 
unconstitutional.  For these kinds of claims, cases like Hill and McDonough still suggest at least the 
alternate availability of habeas, given that prisoners are challenging their confinement itself, not “merely” 
its conditions.  See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; see also id. at 644–46; Hill, 547 U.S. at 580–81; Wilson v. 
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020); Adams v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 481, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2011).  
 293.  151 U.S. 242 (1894).  The other, which Bonner discussed, is In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890).   
 294.  Bonner, 151 U.S. at 254.   
 295.  Id.  
 296.  Id. 
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hard labor.”297  Wherever Bonner could properly be imprisoned, he could 
not be imprisoned in “one of these institutions.”298   
Though the Government conceded that Bonner “should not have been 
sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary,” it argued that “the 
judgment and sentence [we]re not for that cause void so as to entitle the 
petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus for his discharge.”299  The Court 
disagreed.  It observed that, according to the Government’s argument, 
“[i]t would be as well, and be equally within its authority, for the court to 
order the imprisonment to be in the guardhouse of a fort, or the hulks of 
a prison-ship, or in any other place not specified in the law.”300  Habeas 
was therefore proper.301 
For the potential COVID-19 plaintiff, Bonner suggests that even when 
a person may be permissibly imprisoned under a valid conviction for the 
full duration of their sentence, they may nevertheless bring a claim via 
habeas to remove them from imprisonment in a particular place where 
they may not permissibly serve that sentence.302  The challenge of Bonner, 
meanwhile, is its reliance on the sentencing court’s jurisdiction, as 
opposed to the constitutional validity of the current confinement.303  
Clearly, a judge who sentenced a plaintiff to incarceration at a place that 
experienced a runaway COVID-19 outbreak months or years later was not 
acting without jurisdiction because of that subsequent development.   
Nevertheless, federal appellate courts have indicated that Bonner’s 
rationale supports § 2241 jurisdiction in at least some related contexts.304  
The Sixth Circuit itself did so in a 1991 case,305 though in Wilson the 
majority stated (in what is technically dicta) that this earlier holding 
would not extend to permit a court exercising § 2241 jurisdiction to 
require that a prisoner be transferred to another facility.306  This may 
 
 297.  Id. at 254–55.  
 298.  Id. at 255.  
 299.  Id. at 256.   
 300.  Id.  
 301.  See id. at 256, 262.  
 302.  See id. 
 303.  See, e.g., id. at 256, 259.  
 304.  See, e.g., Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Montez attacks the 
execution of his sentence as it affects the fact or duration of his confinement in Colorado. Such an attack, 
focusing on where his sentence will be served, seems to fit better under the rubric of § 2241.”); Kiyemba 
v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The detainees’ claims are not in the nature of an action 
barred by § 2241(e)(2) because, based upon longstanding precedents, it is clear they allege a proper claim 
for habeas relief, specifically an order barring their transfer to or from a place of incarceration.”).   
 305.  See United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 306.  Wilson, 961 F.3d at 839, 839 n.3.  There, the court sought to cabin a prior case, Jalili, in which 
it had previously ruled that a district court had erred in addressing a place-of-confinement challenge under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255, holding that “[b]ecause defendant Jalili is challenging the manner in which the sentence 
was being executed, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, Section 2255 does not apply.” 925 F.2d 
at 893.  The Wilson panel noted that “Jalili was not simply requesting transfer to another BOP facility,” 
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ultimately be a distinction without a meaningful difference: just because 
a district court cannot order prisoners transferred to another facility does 
not mean that, if it orders prisoners released because of unconstitutional 
conditions at their current facility, the prison cannot moot out the case (at 
least as applied to some of them) by transferring them to other, 
constitutionally adequate facilities. 
In any event, whether cast as execution-or-manner claims or place-of-
confinement claims, § 2241 offers specific, well-established analogies to 
show that a COVID-19 habeas claim challenges the fact or duration of a 
prisoner’s confinement in a particular place.  Such a claim does so not 
only for purposes of avoiding the PLRA, but also for purposes of invoking 
habeas jurisdiction regardless of whether “conditions” are part of the 
argument.  Consequently, prisoners seeking to avoid the PLRA and 
invoke habeas jurisdiction may wish to make two overlapping arguments 
(not currently accepted in all jurisdictions) about why they are 
challenging the fact or length of their incarceration. Not all jurisdictions 
currently accept both justifications.  But while the government may have 
the legal authority to imprison the person for a certain period of time 
somewhere, the argument goes, habeas properly comes into play—and the 
PLRA properly does not—because it does not have the legal authority to 
imprison that person where it is currently doing so.  
B. The Scope of the Eighth Amendment Right 
Habeas claims based on the Eighth Amendment also run headlong into 
the doctrinal hurdles raised by the limited scope of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.307  As previously explained, because prisoners must 
challenge the constitutional validity of their confinement itself to fit under 
habeas and avoid the PLRA, the asserted Eighth Amendment violations 
must go to the heart of the confinement and not be remediable by any 
realistic intramural mitigation.308  In other words, the violation must be 
 
but rather “was arguing that he should not be placed in a higher-security facility contrary to the district 
court’s explicit direction that he serve his sentence at a community treatment center.” Wilson, 961 F.3d at 
839 n.3.  “This,” the Wilson court stated, “was properly a challenge to the execution of the district court’s 
sentence and not an invitation for any petitioners seeking transfer to another facility to bring a claim under 
§ 2241.”  Id.  
 307.  In the context of pretrial detainees, whose claims are governed by the Fourteenth rather than 
the Eighth Amendment, there is an open question (and circuit split) as to whether the same test applies.  
See, e.g., Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).  Most courts 
have dodged this question by assuming that the answer is the same regardless of which test they apply 
and then proceeding to focus on the Eighth Amendment analysis.  E.g., id. at 984–88; see supra note 183.  
This Article (and, specifically, this Section) focuses on the Eighth Amendment framework accordingly, 
though it is not clear that this analysis formally applies to people who are incarcerated but have not been 
convicted.  
 308.  Again, I use the word “realistic” because it is no meaningful answer to say that officials can 
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intrinsic to the confinement itself at the relevant point in time.  COVID 
outbreaks in prisons illustrate how this can be true: at least in some 
settings—whether because the nature of a particular facility or because a 
particular outbreak has gained enough of a foothold—there is no fixing 
things within the prison walls. 
The crux of any Eighth Amendment claim in this context is the 
allegation that prison authorities have engaged in “deliberate indifference 
to serious medical needs of prisoners,” which qualifies as a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment.309  For there to be a violation, the prisoner need not be 
actually harmed: authorities may not consciously disregard that someone 
is imprisoned “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm.”310  Such risks include exposure to infectious disease.311 
Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims must satisfy both 
parts of a two-pronged test: an objective prong and a subjective prong.312  
First, the plaintiff “must show that he is incarcerated under conditions 
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”313  Second, he must show that 
“the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference.”314   
What a prison official actually knew, the Supreme Court has explained, 
“is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 
inference from circumstantial evidence” such as “the very fact that the 
risk was obvious.”315  Willful blindness, accordingly, is not an escape 
 
rectify the conditions internally by doing something unrealistic, such as inventing a vaccine or going back 
in time to stop COVID-19 from spreading.  See supra note 282. 
 309.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds 
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some 
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.  The rationale for this principle is simple enough: 
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders 
him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., 
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on 
state action set by the Eighth Amendment . . . .  The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s 
knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the 
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.”).   
 310.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  
 311.  See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978); 
see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (noting that while the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable 
prisons,” it does not “permit inhumane ones,” and thus requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates 
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care” and that their safety is adequately protected 
(citation omitted)).   
 312.  E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.   
 313.  Id.  
 314.  Id. at 837; see also id. at 840 (requiring “consciousness of a risk”).  
 315.  Id. at 842 (citation omitted).   
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hatch.316  For that reason, litigation itself can put a prison official on 
notice—but “to establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must 
demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of the 
litigation and into the future.”317 
It is hard, in the context of COVID-19, to argue that the objective prong 
of the test is not satisfied, though that has not stopped some prison 
authorities from trying.318  Courts have almost uniformly rejected these 
arguments.319  The subjective prong is where the tension lies. 
Often, in deliberate-indifference cases, the problem with establishing 
subjective indifference hinges on the need to show “knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”320  That is because the doctrine “is 
focused on the individual intent of prison officials.”321  For example, 
asking whether the prison doctor unconstitutionally denied someone a 
pain-relieving treatment would mean asking whether she knew that the 
patient was indeed in pain and that other treatments were not working or 
would not work.  In the COVID-19 scenario, by contrast, the risk was 
systemic and obvious, and the alleged indifference was “institutional.”322  
The question was whether the institutions did enough to keep the 
incarcerated people safe against a significant risk that they were plainly 
aware of.  
Litigants have met with very limited success on this question.  Where 
they have made tentative progress in the trial courts, meanwhile, those 
gains have been reversed by appellate courts.  Essentially, the courts have 
treated some official-sounding “plan”—any plan—as satisfactory, even 
where there are indications that the response is insufficient or that the 
institution has not in fact followed its own protocols.   
The Elkton case is illustrative: the Sixth Circuit majority credited the 
BOP’s “six-phase action plan to reduce the risk of COVID-19 spread at 
 
 316.  See id. at 843 n.8 (giving example of prison official who “knows that some diseases are 
communicable and that a single need is being used to administer flu shots” yet “refuses to listen to a 
subordinate who he strongly suspects” will discuss the danger). 
 317.  Id. at 846; see id. n.9 (noting that “prison officials who state during the litigation that they will 
not take reasonable measures to abate an intolerable risk of which they are aware” cannot “claim to be 
subjectively blameless” and that courts “may take such developments into account”). 
 318.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Garrett & Kovarsky, 
supra note 1, at 46–47.   
 319.  E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d  at 840; Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476, 507 (D.N.J. 
2020); see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 
 320.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.  
 321.  Godfrey, supra note 4, at 155.  
 322.  Cf. id. at 154 (noting that “[f]ederal courts have provided little direction in how a prisoner can 
demonstrate the deliberate indifference of an institution, that is, the deliberate indifference of the prison 
system that confines him”), id. at 186-94 (offering potential sources of proof “to establish institutional 
knowledge”).  
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Elkton,”323 while the dissenting judge observed that this “phrase 
sound[ed] good on paper” but that “look[ing] behind the curtain” showed 
the “plan” was “far less impressive than its title suggests.”324  Few 
institutions, meanwhile, have been reckless enough not to have a plan in 
place, and in fact most seem to have taken at least some steps.325 
Part of the problem, as other scholars have noted, is that subjective 
indifference has always been a high hurdle, and many federal appellate 
courts have raised it even higher since the Supreme Court laid out the 
standard in Farmer in 1994.326  There are good arguments that these 
approaches are inconsistent with Farmer,327 but these arguments have not 
gained traction, least of all in the COVID-19 cases.  While you might 
think that prison officials who persist in an approach that they know is 
doomed to fail are consciously disregarding a serious risk to prisoner 
wellbeing, the response from appellate courts has been closer to how most 
professors treat pass/fail classes: so long as you turn in something legible, 
you pass.328 
To give prison officials fair credit, there is only so much that they could 
have been expected to do intramurally.  COVID-19 is a dangerous and 
highly communicable disease; it thrives in congregate, indoor 
environments like nursing homes and especially lower-security prisons, 
where social distancing is effectively impossible.329  For that reason, one 
 
 323.  Wilson, 961 F.3d at 841; see also Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2020); 
Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2020); Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 988 
(6th Cir. 2020); Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1131–32 (N.D. Ill. 2020). 
 324.  Wilson, 961 F.3d at 848 (Cole, C.J., dissenting); see also Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 991–92 
(Cole, C.J., dissenting) (noting indications that prison was simply putting on a show for a court-ordered 
inspection and meanwhile taking other steps that ran directly contrary to best practices, such as 
transferring prisoners who raised concerns about prison hygiene or their own symptoms to less hygienic 
environments).  
 325.  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 1, at 11 (“For their part, corrections administrators around the 
country began implementing measures to address the threat.  Family visits were canceled, programs were 
suspended, and lockdowns were instituted for all residents not performing essential labor.  A flurry of 
additional policies were also adopted, including those establishing enhanced cleaning protocols; providing 
for the distribution of masks, gloves, and cleaning supplies; requiring isolation of the infected; limiting 
movement and transfers between facilities; and ordering residents to socially distance as much as 
possible.”).  
 326.  Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 71, 79–80, 82.  
 327.  E.g., id. at 80 n.50.  Farmer has also shown itself susceptible to critique, e.g., Dolovich, supra 
note 4, at 895–907, but given this Article’s goals, I take it as a given.   
 328.  See, e.g., Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (“The record simply does not support any suggestion 
that Defendants have turned the kind of blind eye and deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate 
‘total unconcern’ for the inmates’ welfare.” (citation omitted)).   
 329.  See, e.g., Philip D. Sloane, Cruise Ships, Nursing Homes, and Prisons as COVID-19 
Epicenters: A “Wicked Problem” With Breakthrough Solutions?, 21 J. AM. MED. DIR. ASSOC. 958 (2020); 
Anna Flagg & Joseph Neff, Why Jails Are So Important in the Fight Against Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/upshot/coronavirus-jails-prisons.html; Amanda 
Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, If Inaction Continues, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion/coronavirus-in-jails.html. 
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can see why officials’ multistep plans were destined to be insufficient.  
But that is the crux of the paradigmatic prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 
COVID-19 habeas claim: the Eighth Amendment requires reasonably 
responsive action, and the only reasonably responsive action is release 
from an environment in which social distancing is impossible.  Just as a 
prison doctor who continued treating a prisoner with a medication known 
to be ineffective to treat the prisoner’s disease would be deliberately 
indifferent, so too would a warden who continued implementing a 
multistep “plan” known to be ineffective.330  This was the upshot of the 
rulings in the FCI Danbury and FCI Lompoc litigation: where even the 
Attorney General had recognized that releasing prisoners to home 
confinement was necessary to stanch the outbreak, not doing so (or doing 
so in the most recalcitrant way possible) was deliberately indifferent.331  
It was like telling a prisoner whose diagnosis required chemotherapy that 
you had a multiphase plan to ensure he received lots of antibiotics and 
vitamins.  It wasn’t nothing; it just wasn’t the thing that you knew was 
necessary, either.   
Swain v. Junior—the Miami-Dade jail case—illustrates this tension 
well.332  On the one hand, the majority that vacated the preliminary 
injunction could reasonably point to the fact that the jail officials really 
had taken some decent steps—far more, in fact, than many of their 
colleagues elsewhere.333  They had purchased advanced diagnostic and 
air-purifying tools, had tested fairly rigorously, and had released nearly 
900 detainees, with more evidently to come.334  That does not mean that 
the detainees and the dissent were incorrect, however, in observing that 
these efforts alone were insufficient to reduce the risk: social distancing 
was still impossible.335  What COVID-19 made plain was that being 
locked inside a government compound with a lot of other people can itself 
pose a substantial risk of harm, and leaving people locked inside there 
despite knowing that fact can and should give rise to a colorable Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
COVID-19 presents, of course, a novel situation for prison officials, as 
it has for the world—and no prison to my knowledge has faced the 
 
 330.  See, e.g., Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (“continuing to treat him with 
Methotrexate after Darrah had been on the drug for several months without any noticeable improvement”); 
Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Intentional failure to provide 
service acknowledged to be necessary is the deliberate indifference proscribed by the Constitution.”).   
 331.  See, e.g., Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 442–46 (D. Conn. 2020); Torres v. 
Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 740 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. 
Ohio 2020), vacated, Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 332.  See supra Section II.D.2.  
 333.  See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020).   
 334.  Id.   
 335.  See id. at 1283 (acknowledging this argument); id. at 1296–97 (Martin, J., dissenting).  
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sinkhole hypothetical with which this Article began.  But the basic 
scenario—the confinement itself causing the unconstitutional 
conditions—is not unprecedented.  When hurricanes and flooding 
threaten a particular prison, for example, it is quite possible that continued 
confinement in that place would violate the Eighth Amendment in a way 
that no change to the intramural conditions could rectify.336  Likewise, 
when Valley Fever menaced prisoners in California, those prisoners too 
had colorable claims that their continued confinement violated the Eighth 
Amendment, though the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against them on 
qualified-immunity grounds without addressing the underlying Eighth 
Amendment question.337 
Of course, as prison officials are quick to remind plaintiffs, “the 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”338  And appellate 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have often treated it as a matter 
of structural fact—rather than a national (and remediable) disgrace— that 
“[j]ails are often crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous places.”339  But 
COVID-19 offered the first widespread example of a menace that both: 
(1)  alarmed society at large enough to upend daily life; and (2) was 
demonstrably worsened by incarceration, in the sense that the most 
effective prophylaxis available (social distancing) was impossible under 
most conditions of confinement.  This was particularly, and 
paradoxically, true in the dormitory-style prisons (like the geriatric Texas 
“Pack Unit” pictured below) where the lowest-security prisoners—the 






 336.  Cf., e.g., Kalhan Rosenblatt, Harvey Prompts 5 Texas Prisons to Evacuate Nearly 6,000 
Inmates, NBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-
harvey/harvey-prompts-5-texas-prisons-evacuate-nearly-6-000-inmates-n797086.  
 337.  See Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2019).  The Hines court based its ruling 
on the fact that (1) “a federal court supervised the officials’ actions,” and (2) the risks involved did not 
violate evolving standards of decency “given that millions of free individuals tolerate a heightened risk of 
Valley Fever by voluntarily living in California’s Central Valley and elsewhere.”  Id. at 1231.  Along the 
way, the court observed that, given that “the prisoners are confined together, it is especially important that 
Valley Fever is not contagious.”  Id. at 1226.  Unlike many of the COVID-19 cases discussed here, the 
prisoners sought money damages under § 1983 rather than release (or transfer) pursuant to a habeas 
statute.  See id. at 1226.  In Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2013), the District Court 
granted prisoners’ request for an order excluding medically vulnerable prisoners from an area where they 
were at high risk of contracting Valley Fever.  Id. at 1229–30.  That court also noted the hypothetical of 
a prison “so dilapidated that no one could predict when the walls would crumble down.”  Id. at 1223. 
 338.  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
 339.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 333 (2012). 
 340.  E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833, 840 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting Elkton’s status as a 
low-security, dormitory-style facility and the serious risks posed by dormitory-style housing).  
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Figure 3. The Texas “Pack Unit”341 
 
The federal prisons, and a great many state authorities, had the power 
to implement that prophylaxis by placing prisoners on home confinement, 
transferring them to safer facilities, or granting reprieves.342  That their 
largely insufficient intramural efforts were deemed sufficient to satisfy 
the Eighth Amendment represents a swerve away from actually requiring 
liability where an “official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of 
a substantial risk of serious harm,”343 such as “when a prison official 
knows that some diseases are communicable and that a single needle is 
being used to administer flu shots to prisoners but refuses to listen to a 
subordinate who he strongly suspects will attempt to explain the 
associated risk of transmitting disease.”344  I return to what may account 
for this swerve in Section III.F below.  
 
 341.  Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 2021). 
 342.  See supra Section I.C.   
 343.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). 
 344.  Id. at 843 n.8; see also Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 82; Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 
47–49. 
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C. Class-Wide Adjudication 
Another flashpoint that arose in some COVID-19 habeas cases was the 
use of class-wide adjudication—a question that can arise in either a 
habeas case or a civil-rights case but is more complicated in the habeas 
posture.   
The threshold issue with regard to habeas cases is that the Supreme 
Court “has never addressed whether habeas relief can be pursued in a 
class action” or a similar aggregate format.345 While that is true, many 
appellate courts have answered that question in the affirmative.346  
Furthermore, the Federal Rules that govern Section 2254 and 2255 cases 
provide that the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they 
are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be 
applied to a proceeding under these rules.”347  Although most COVID-19 
habeas claims arise under § 2241 rather than §§ 2254, 2255,348 the same 
logic holds for § 2241 claims, and authority to apply this same logic likely 
stems from 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which directs courts sitting in habeas to 
“summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law 
and justice require.”349 
Leaving that threshold question aside, in civil-rights cases and, to the 
extent that Rule 23 is at least applicable by analogy,350 in habeas cases as 
well, COVID-19-related claims pass at least some of Rule 23’s tests with 
flying colors.  To start, the classes are inherently numerous351—prisons 
usually house thousands of inmates, a significant fraction of whom are 
older and sicker than the general public.352  Furthermore, there are 
 
 345.  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 858 n.7 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.10 (1984)). 
 346.  See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Morgan 
v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1126-
27 (2d Cir. 1974) (judiciary has power, without fully importing Rule 23, “to fashion for habeas actions 
appropriate modes of procedure[] by analogy”); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 
1973); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e conclude that while Rule 23, Fed. R. 
Civ. P., does not apply, a representative action may be maintained in the unusual circumstances of this 
case, limited to federal prisoners in custody in the district in which the district court sits . . . .”).  
 347.  U.S. Courts, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and 
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 12 (as amended to 
Dec. 1, 2019)  https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules_governing_section_2254_and_2255 
_cases_in_the_u.s._district_courts_-_dec_1_2019.pdf.   
 348.  See supra Section III.A.  
 349.  28 U.S.C. § 2243. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81 (“These rules apply to proceedings for habeas 
corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not specified in a federal statute, the 
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases; and (B) has previously 
conformed to the practice in civil actions.”).   
 350.  See, e.g., Bijeol, 513 F.2d at 967; Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 450 (D. 
Conn. 2020) (citing Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1125).   
 351.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
 352.  See Matt McKillop & Alex Boucher, Aging Prison Populations Drive Up Costs, PEW TRUSTS 
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obvious “questions of law and fact common or fact common to the 
class.”353  The extent to which prisoners are at risk of catching COVID-
19 and the degree to which prison officials have responded adequately to 
that risk involve “common contention[s]” that, when determined, “will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of one of the claims 
in one stroke.”354 
Typicality and adequacy are arguably more difficult to satisfy.  
Typicality requires that each named petitioner raise claims that are 
“typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”355  In one sense, this will 
always be true: petitioners will, like all putative class members, be 
incarcerated within the same facility under relatively similar conditions, 
and in the case of a subclass, will be medically vulnerable, whether due 
to age or pre-existing medical conditions.356  Nevertheless, each 
prisoner’s suitability for a particular form of relief may vary.  Some may 
be strong candidates for home confinement because of health 
vulnerabilities, relatively short sentences, solid institutional records, or 
strong re-entry plans, while others may be poor candidates because of 
good health, long sentences, significant blemishes in their institutional 
records, or limited re-entry prospects.   
Adequacy—the requirement that named petitioners “fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class”357—follows a similar logic.  
On one hand, assuming satisfactory legal counsel is involved, the 
petitioners’ interests should be aligned: all seek relief from assertedly 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement via some ““quantum change 
in the level of [their] custody.”358  On the other hand, some petitioners 
 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/02/20/aging-prison-
populations-drive-up-costs; Tomoko Udo, Chronic Medical Conditions in U.S. Adults with Incarceration 
History, 38 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 217 (2019), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30762401/; Li & Lewis, 
supra note 15. 
 353.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  
 354.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011); see, e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472 
F. Supp. 3d 713, 744 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“The Court finds all class members have been subjected to 
significant risk of exposure to COVID-19.  Common facts include the process by Respondents in 
considering Lompoc inmates for home confinement and compassionate release are common to the entire 
putative class, and common questions exist as to whether Respondents’ failure to make prompt and 
meaningful use of home confinement and compassionate release in light of the pandemic, and disregard 
of inmates’ age and medical conditions in determining eligibility for home confinement and 
compassionate release violate the Eighth Amendment.”); cf., e.g., Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780 
F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Common issues—such as liability—may be certified, consistent with Rule 
23, even where other issues—such as damages—do not lend themselves to classwide proof.”).  
 355.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).  
 356.  See, e.g., Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 452 (D. Conn. 2020) (finding 
typicality satisfied “because the process at issue is applicable to all inmates, ‘each member’s claim arises 
from the same course of events’—the establishment and operation of this process—’and each class 
member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability’” (citation omitted)).  
 357.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  
 358.  Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v. 
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may have strong incentives to push for the maximal relief (release for 
everyone, understanding that only the most maximal relief will benefit 
them), while others may be willing to accept more limited relief (for 
example, because they are more likely to benefit from even minimal 
relief).   
In addition to Rule 23(a)’s class-action prerequisites, there is potential 
debate regarding Rule 23(b)’s separate requirement that the putative class 
action fit into one of three (or four) types of class actions.  Rule 23(b)(2) 
is perhaps the most obvious choice, given that “a common use of Rule 
23(b)(2) is in prisoner actions brought to challenge various practices or 
rules in the prisons on the ground that they violate the constitution.”359   
To satisfy Rule 23(b)(2), petitioners must show that the relevant 
officials have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”360  In other words, “[t]he 
key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or 
declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it 
can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members 
or as to none of them.’”361  This test raises the same basic concerns for 
COVID-19 habeas petitioners that can arise with regard to typicality and 
adequacy: some individuals will be more suitable for a remedy like 
release than others.362  The same issue can be said to apply to Rule 
23(b)(1) and (b)(3).363   
 
Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)).   
 359.  WRIGHT & MILLER, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1776.1 (3d ed.); see also Braggs v. 
Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 667 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (“Rule 23(b)(2) has been liberally applied in the area of 
civil rights, including suits challenging conditions and practices at various detention facilities.”).  
 360.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  
 361.  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).   
 362.  See, e.g., Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“The imperative of 
individualized determinations, recognized by both sides in this case, makes this case inappropriate for 
class treatment.”); Sabata v. Nebraska Dep't of Corr. Servs., 337 F.R.D. 215, 270 (D. Neb. 2020) (“The 
Court believes that any potential differences in separate prosecutions resulting in different outcomes 
would be attributable to the wide factual variations in individual inmates’ medical situations.  Further, as 
in Dukes, the Court is concerned that many members of the proposed class and subclasses have no claim 
for the proposed injunctive relief.”).   
 363.  Rule 23(b)(1) applies when “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class 
members would create a risk of” either “(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . that would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct” for the defendants or “(B) adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members . . . 
or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).  
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
Courts have observed that “Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions predominate, not that the action 
include only common questions.”  Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 484 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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An answer to this counterargument is that all petitioners seek at least 
some common relief, likely in the form of a declaratory judgment that the 
prison officials have violated the Eighth Amendment  as well as in the 
form of injunctive relief in setting up a process that leads to release for 
some and safer conditions for others.364  This situation will exist in a 
number of paradigmatic class-action situations, such as where prisoners 
with a common disease sue for access to a certain medical treatment.365  
While they may not all end up qualifying for treatment, they are all 
claiming at least an entitlement under the Eighth Amendment to be 
considered for the treatment.  The same logic holds in the COVID-19 
context: even if some prisoners will not end up qualifying for release, they 
are all claiming that they have been deprived of the consideration for such 
release that is due under the Eighth Amendment.  And they are likewise 
all claiming a corresponding constitutional entitlement to be considered 
for release on terms that comply with the Eighth Amendment.   
D. Federalism, Comity, and Exhaustion 
Lurking in the background of many of the COVID-19 cases (at least on 
appeal) has been the concern that federal district courts might 
unallowably “assume[] the role of ‘super-warden.’”366  These concerns 
perhaps ring out differently when the facility involved is a state rather 
than federal facility.  In theory, they should not: the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel & Unusual Punishments clause applies equally to the States and to 
the Federal Government.367  Nevertheless, federalism and comity 
concerns have arisen when a state facility is under scrutiny. 
 
 364.  See e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 746 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“Here, Respondents’ 
failure to make prompt and reasonable use of home confinement and compassionate release in light of the 
pandemic which takes into account inmates’ age and medical conditions is applicable to each member of 
the class so that injunctive relief is appropriate as to the class as a whole.  Accordingly, the Court finds 
Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied.”); see also Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 739 (E.D. Mich. 2020), 
amended, No. 20-10829, 2020 WL 4818894 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2020) (“[T]he class seeks both a 
determination of whether Defendants’ actions or failures to act in response to COVID-19 amount to 
violations of civil detainees’ constitutional rights in the aggregate and declaratory relief setting forth the 
minimum constitutional conditions of confinement.  Such a declaration would be universally applicable; 
an injunction ordering Defendants to reduce the detainee population at the Calhoun County Correctional 
Facility, if necessary, would also apply to ‘all class members or . . . to none.’” (quoting Brown v. Plata, 
563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011))).  
 365.  E.g., Postawko v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:16-CV-04219, 2017 WL 3185155, at *14, 
aff’d, 910 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 366.  See Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 
1159, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019); Prison Legal News v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 890 F.3d 954, 965 (11th 
Cir. 2018)).  Garrett and Kovarsky note the unfortunate echo in legal history that at least some COVID-
19 forms of relief “placed [federal] judges in precisely the receivership roles that . . . historically made 
the Supreme Court uncomfortable,” yielding much of modern prison-conditions doctrine.  See Garrett & 
Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 56; see also id. at 44 & n.272,  
 367.  See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). 
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Sometimes, these concerns may motivate particularly strict 
enforcement of exhaustion requirements.368  In the late nineteenth 
century, this doctrine provided that “as a matter of comity, federal courts 
should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state 
courts have had an opportunity to act.”369  “Subsequent cases refined the 
principle that state remedies must be exhausted except in unusual 
circumstances,” with comity remaining the motivating influence.370  
These same principles are reflected (albeit not to the exclusion of other 
motives) in AEDPA’s provisions for challenging the validity of state 
convictions and sentences371 as well as the PLRA,372 each of which make 
exceptions when a state-court remedy is not “available.”373  Remedies are 
not “available” when they “are alternatives to the standard review process 
and where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies 
in the past.”374 
There are ample reasons to conclude that state remedies would not be 
“available” for COVID-19 habeas claims, whether because of a mismatch 
between slow state processes and a rapidly spreading virus,375 or because 
state postconviction procedures do not allow for challenging the 
execution or manner of a sentence in the way that § 2241 does.376  For 
example, in the litigation over Michigan’s Oakland County Jail, the 
district court concluded that the Michigan law at issue did not “set forth a 
remedy for inmates to pursue” and thus, even if a few had “obtained relief 
through this mechanism,” it was not “part of the ‘standard review process’ 
and [was] not a remedy through which state courts ha[d] ‘provided relief 
. . . in the past.’”377 
 
 368.  Garrett and Kovarsky come to a related conclusion, observing that exhaustion requirements 
arose as a common means for courts to dispatch cases without reaching more charged substantive and 
remedial questions.  See Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–46, 52–53.   
 369.  See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 
(1886)).   
 370.  Id. 
 371.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).  
 372.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 373.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 
847–48 (1999) (AEDPA); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016) (PLRA).   
 374.  O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844.   
 375.  See Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 60 (2020) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from 
denial of application to vacate stay) (“Given the speed at which the contagion spread, the 160-day 
grievance process offered no realistic prospect of relief.  In just 116 days, nearly 500 inmates contracted 
COVID-19, leading to 74 hospitalizations and 19 deaths.”).   
 376.  See also Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 437 (D. Conn. May 12, 2020) 
(finding “undue prejudice” exception applies in context of suit over federal facility, FCI Danbury). 
 377.  Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 768 (E.D. Mich.), vacated, 815 F. App’x 978 
(6th Cir. 2020); see also Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 20-1469, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741, at *5 (6th 
Cir. May 26, 2020).  But see Cameron, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741, at *19–21 (Bush, J., dissenting 
from denial of stay). 
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Nevertheless, exhaustion requirements have at times proven a 
significant barrier.  Staying the district court’s permanent injunction in 
Valentine (the case involving the Texas “Pack Unit”), the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that “Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies 
before filing suit [was] fatal,” even though the district court had found 
that the prison’s “grievance process was lengthy and unlikely to provide 
necessary COVID-19 relief” and that, “[b]y all accounts, the process was 
suboptimal.”378  In Swain (the case involving the Miami-Dade jail), the 
Eleventh Circuit majority concluded that the district court had erred in 
issuing a preliminary injunction by “refusing to consider the defendants’ 
arguments with respect to PLRA exhaustion.”379  As the dissent noted, the 
majority arrived at this conclusion despite the fact that the prison officials’ 
brief in opposition had “included a scant two paragraphs of argument on 
administrative exhaustion and no citations to the record” and instead tried 
to incorporate by reference a lengthy motion “filed on a different briefing 
schedule” to which the prisoners had not yet been able to respond—a 
procedural maneuver that the Eleventh Circuit itself would never have 
countenanced.380 
Federalism and comity concerns arose in other doctrinal settings as 
well.  In staying the district court’s preliminary injunction in Valentine, 
for example, the Fifth Circuit panel majority chided the district court for 
mandating intensive intramural measures, stating that while these 
requirements “may be salutary health measures,” their “level of 
micromanagement, enforced upon threat of contempt, does not reflect the 
principles of comity commanded by the PLRA.”381  In staying the 
preliminary injunction in Swain, the majority deemed it irreparable harm 
that the jail officials would “lose the discretion vested in them under state 
law to allocate scarce resources among different county operations 
necessary to fight the pandemic.”382 
In denying a preliminary injunction in Money, the Illinois prison-
system case, Judge Dow was even more direct while weighing the public-
interest factor in the analysis.  He wrote that “[t]he public interest also 
 
 378.  Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2020).  But see Valentine, 141 S.Ct. at 60 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay) (noting the absurdity of asking 
prisoners facing COVID-19 risk to exhaust a “160-day grievance process” that “offered no realistic 
prospect of relief” and pointing out that at least one prisoner, Alvin Norris, had “died before the prison 
took any steps in response to his grievance”). 
 379.  Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 380.  Id. at 1302 (Martin, J., dissenting).   
 381.  Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 806 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 
1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (finding irreparable harm to jail officials because, “[a]bsent a 
stay, the defendants will lose the discretion vested in them under state law to allocate scarce resources 
among different county operations necessary to fight the pandemic”).  
 382.  Swain, 958 F.3d at 1090.  
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commands respect for federalism and comity, which means that 
courts must approach the entire enterprise of federal judicial intrusion into 
the core activities of the state cautiously and with humility.”383  He noted 
that the prisoners sought “a process that could result in the release of at 
least 12,000 inmates,” or “almost one-third of the prison population in 
Illinois.”384   
The other side of this observation, of course, was that approximately 
12,000 prisoners had “serious underlying medical conditions that put 
them at particular risk of serious harm or death from COVID-19” and 
were eligible for medical furlough under Illinois law.385  But in the Money 
analysis, the scope of the danger became, at least in part, a weakness 
rather than a strength for the prisoners’ case.    
E. Preliminary vs. Final Relief 
A final doctrinal tension in the COVID-19 habeas cases has concerned 
the nature of the remedy—specifically, whether a district court is being 
asked to grant (1) a preliminary release while a meritorious habeas case 
proceeds, or (2) release as an ultimate remedy, vindicating a meritorious 
habeas claim.386  At the heart of this tension is one of the most noteworthy 
pieces of non-judicial writing in this set of cases: a declaration by 
Professor Judith Resnik, discussing the federal courts’ somewhat-
forgotten “enlargement” power.387 
The Resnik declaration spans fourteen pages.  At its core is a discussion 
of “the availability of provisional remedies,”388 and, specifically, “an 
aspect of federal judicial power that is less well-known” called 
“enlargement.”389  The declaration explains enlargement as a term unique 
to the habeas context (though comparable in many ways to “bail”) that 
 
 383.  Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 2020). 
 384.  Id. at 1134; see also id. at 1128–29 (“Plaintiffs’ motion also raises serious concerns under 
core principles of federalism and the separation of powers, especially given their request for sweeping 
relief in the form of a mandatory injunction. . . . It is no accident that the federal judiciary only rarely 
intrudes into the management of state prisons, and only once in history has actually ordered the release of 
prisoners on a scale anywhere near what Plaintiffs hope to accomplish through this litigation.”).  
 385.  Id. at 1115–16.  
 386.  This question is distinct from whether the litigation itself is at the preliminary or final relief 
stage — a judge can still grant, via a preliminary injunction, the same form of ultimate relief that will 
become the permanent injunction.  See, e.g., De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 
220 (1945).  Separately, as Garrett and Kovarsky note, “much of the early decisional law developed in 
preliminary procedural postures,” for example in litigation over preliminary injunctions or TROs.  See 
Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 25.   
 387.  Declaration of Prof. Judith Resnik at 8, Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 
2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02094), ECF No. 24-3  [hereinafter “Resnik Decl.”]. 
 388.  Id. at 7.  
 389.  Id. at 8.   
57
Zuckerman: When the Conditions are the Confinement: Eighth Amendment Habeas
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
58 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
denotes “a provisional remedy that modifies custody by expanding the 
site in which it takes place.”390  “In some ways,” the declaration continues, 
“enlargement resembles a prison furlough,” albeit one that “stems from 
courts’ inherent powers.”391  It “provides an opportunity for increasing 
the safety of prisoners, staff, and their communities while judges consider 
a myriad of complex legal questions.”392 
This form of relief is not the same as “a release order,” given that the 
prisoner “remains in custody[,] even as the place of custody is changed 
and thus ‘enlarged’ from a particular prison to a hospital, halfway house, 
a person’s home, or other setting.”393  That distinction should—much as 
its status as a habeas remedy should—exempt it from the PLRA’s 
strictures.394 
The declaration collects cases from nine federal circuits recognizing 
this power, along with three others that at least arguably do so.395  Few of 
these precedents come from the past thirty years; however, some of the 
more recent cases cabin rather than expand this power.  For example, in 
1955, in Johnston v. Marsh,396 the Third Circuit dealt with a habeas 
petition from an advanced diabetic hoping to “be admitted to bail pending 
decision on the merits” because he was quickly going blind.397  The 
district court granted an enlargement and the Third Circuit affirmed, 
concluding that the trial court’s jurisdiction over the petition itself gave it 
the power to act.398  Nearly four decades later, the same appellate court 
reaffirmed this power, but emphasized that it was “limited” and 
appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances.”399   
At least a few district courts facing COVID-19 habeas litigation 
rediscovered this power, though it has at times been ambiguous whether 
they exercised it toward provisional ends, final ends, or both.  In the 
Elkton litigation, Judge Gwin’s (later-vacated) order granted “a 
 
 390.  Id. 
 391.  Id.; see also id. at 5, 9 (noting federal courts’ authority to manage habeas cases “as law and 
justice requires” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243)).   
 392.  Resnick Decl., supra note 389, at 8.  
 393.  See, e.g., id.  
 394.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A), (g)(2); Resnik Decl. at 8.  
 395.  See id. at 10 (primarily citing Woodcock v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 93, 43 (1st Cir. 1972); Mapp 
v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001); Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990); 
Cherek v. United States, 767 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 
1986); Pfaff v. Wells, 648 F.2d 689, 693 (10th Cir. 1981): and Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342, 1342-44 
(D.C. Cir. 1969), and also citing Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Perkins, 53 F. App’x 667, 669 (4th Cir. 2002); and Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)).   
 396.  227 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1955). 
 397.  Id. at 529.   
 398.  See id. at 530–31.   
 399.  Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239.   
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preliminary injunction, in aid of its authority to grant enlargements, 
ordering Respondents to determine the appropriate means of transferring 
medically vulnerable subclass members out of Elkton.”400  In the Danbury 
litigation, Judge Shea, responding to counsel’s characterization, treated 
enlargement as “a process by which inmates would be evaluated promptly 
for transfer to home confinement, with the urgency reflected in the 
Attorney General’s April 3 memo.”401  In the Oakland County Jail 
litigation, Judge Parker did not explicitly mention enlargement, but 
instead referred to “bail” and “release on bond” for medically vulnerable 
inmates.402  
To some degree, the two kinds of relief converge on each other, 
ouroboros-like, in the COVID-19 habeas posture: the paradigmatic 
petitioner seeks to have his custody enlarged while his meritorious habeas 
claim proceeds, but his habeas claim is meritorious because he has an 
Eighth Amendment right to have his custody enlarged.  This oddity 
should not create significant difficulties for petitioners—if such relief is 
permissible as a provisional remedy, which it undeniably is, then it 
follows that it must also be permissible as a final remedy.403  Nevertheless, 
it may cause some doctrinal confusion, and appellate courts may wish to 
define the nature of this relief more clearly for future petitioners.  It would 
make sense to clarify that enlargement itself, as the Resnik declaration 
suggests, is a provisional remedy that—in unique and fast-moving 
contexts like the COVID-19 pandemic—can support the equivalent final 
remedy of (at least temporary) release.  
F. Rights and Remedies  
Though never addressed doctrinally, an additional tension that haunts 
the COVID-19 cases is the long-running war between rights and 
remedies: a series of battles that almost necessarily operate beneath the 
surface.404  In theory, of course, constitutional law requires judges “to be 
 
 400.  Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467, 474 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated, Wilson v. Williams, 
961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 401.  Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 416 n. 1 (D. Conn. 2020); see also id. at 416, 
430–31 (discussing enlargement more as a final remedy than a provisional one).  
 402.  Order at 6–7, Cameron, No. 2:20-cv-10949 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2020), D.E. 94, vacated, 
Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).  
 403.  Cf. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (“A preliminary 
injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be 
granted finally.”). 
 404.  For some of the most prominent entries in this literature, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 633 (2006); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); and Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).  See also, 
e.g., Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term — Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
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detached from the political arena and to follow processes conducive to 
reflection and reason.”405  This ideal of the judicial role reflects “the 
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of 
impersonal and reasoned judgments.”406  But this aspiration “is always 
tempered by the reality it serves. . . . [C]ourts read the text illuminated by 
the world outside judicial chambers.”407  If they do not, they will fail to 
“generate assent to the norms that they affirm, or else life will corrode 
their interpretations.”408 
For that reason, rights and remedies are perpetually locked in combat: 
“The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy—the recognition 
that rights are not actual people in an actual world—makes it inevitable 
that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds 
will shuttle back and forth between right and remedy.”409  Professor Paul 
Gewirtz chronicled this struggle in the school-desegregation cases,410 and 
Professor Darryl Levinson has done the same for an array of contexts, 
including prison litigation.411  In the prison-conditions context, Levinson 
notes the trajectory of courts (especially the Supreme Court) responding 
to “expansive district court structural reform” in earlier decades by 
“curtail[ing] the scope of the right,” limiting the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment such that it is violated in only the most extreme cases.412   
These challenges become acute in any hot-button context, and the 
crime-and-punishment context is no exception.  The Fourth Amendment 
 
1 (1979); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (1999); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without 
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 481–84 (2004); Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword: 
Rights As Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 33 (2018); Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, 
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1414–21 (1988); William J. 
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 (1991).  Technically, this rights–
remedies dyad is an overgeneralization, as scholars have at times focused on the interplay between 
justiciability and merits, between merits and remedies, or among all three.  See Levinson, supra (merits 
and remedies); Gewirtz, supra (same); Pierce, supra (justiciability and merits); Fallon, supra (all three).  
I invoke it in the general sense closest to Fallon’s, to denote the way in which courts may “adjust or 
manipulate applicable law,” regardless of its “doctrinal category,” based in part on concerns about 
ultimate results.  See Fallon, supra, at 637.  Garrett and Kovarsky come to a similar conclusion in this 
context, observing that judges in COVID-19 cases “often avoided intrusive relief by changing the way 
crucial rights and remedies were defined and applied,” Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 44, 
particularly in the context of habeas suits seeking release, id. at 45–46.   
 405.  Gewirtz, supra note 404, at 677.  
 406.  Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). 
 407.  Gewirtz, supra note 404, at 677. 
 408.  Id. 
 409.  Id. at 679.   
 410.  Id. at 609–28.  
 411.  Levison, supra note 404, at 874–99; see also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 44 (noting 
this same scholarly echo).   
 412.  Levison, supra note 404, at 881 (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991); 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 338 (1981); and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).  
60
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1
2021] WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT 61 
offers a paradigmatic example: looming over every search-and-seizure 
case in the modern (post–Mapp v. Ohio413) era is the possibility that “[t]he 
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”414  This 
possibility creates a risk of bias, much like knowledge of an injury risks 
biasing a jury in a negligence case.415  The special problem, as Professor 
William Stuntz pointed out, is that “the ‘injury’ that triggers the 
suppression hearing makes the claimant inherently unsympathetic.”416  
“One of the prerequisites for the defendant’s fourth amendment claim—
the existence of suppressible evidence of crime—tends to suggest that the 
defendant deserves punishment, not relief.”417 
The same problem emerges in the COVID-19 prison context.  Scholars 
and society-members alike recognize that people confined to congregate 
environments—whether cruise ships, nursing homes, or prisons and 
jails—are at higher risk of infectious diseases like COVID-19.418  But the 
advisability of taking cruises notwithstanding being trapped in only one 
of these three environments “makes the claimant inherently 
unsympathetic.”419  A prerequisite for being subject to this inordinate 
risk—being locked in a prison or jail—“tends to suggest that the 
[petitioner] deserves punishment, not relief.”420 
A key difference is that the Eighth Amendment prohibits gratuitous 
“inflictions of punishment”—the habeas petitioner has already had his 
punishment meted out, and it is not the warden’s province to add more.421  
Nevertheless, it does not take a sophisticated public-opinion analysis to 
recognize that prisoners are not the most popular litigants, and judges 
might have thought twice before allowing hundreds or even thousands of 
prisoners to return home as a result of having been incarcerated during a 
pandemic.422  That courts manifested willingness to grant such relief at all 
 
 413.  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 414.  See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).  
 415.  Stuntz, supra note 404, at 911–12.  
 416.  Id. at 912.  
 417.  Id.  This problem helps explain, Stuntz argued, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the ex ante 
warrant requirement.  Id. at 915–37, 942.  
 418.  See supra note 329.  
 419.  See Stuntz, supra note 404, at 912.  
 420.  See id. 
 421.  See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994). 
 422.  It is possible that some judges also considered the specter of future money damages, though 
to my knowledge the issue never came up in any of the litigation.  After all, a ruling that officials had 
violated the Eighth Amendment could have future issue preclusive—and even nonmutually issue-
preclusive—effects.  See generally B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148, 135 S. Ct. 
1293, 1303 (2015); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–33 (1979).  A damages action along 
these lines would almost inevitably trigger questions about the scope of Heck bar, at least as sometimes 
phrased by the Supreme Court, given its practical effect on the “length of” a sentence.  See Nelson v. 
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004) (“[A] § 1983 suit for damages that would ‘necessarily imply’ the 
invalidity of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length of an 
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speaks both to the value of an independent judiciary, and to the vitality of 
constitutional norms that protect even the most marginalized.423 
Nonetheless, the overall picture painted by the COVID-19 cases—
which unfolded while prisoners contracted the illness at staggering rates, 
leading to numerous deaths424—is a grim one.  As Dolovich notes, only 
two cases involving prisons or jails ended especially favorably, and even 
those yielded limited releases.425  The carceral facilities from which 
litigants had even tentative success, tended to be lower-security 
facilities,426 civil immigration detention facilities,427 prisons “for the 
elderly and the infirm,”428 or jails with pretrial detainees (that is, legally 
innocent petitioners).429  Notably, Garrett and Kovarsky suggest that 
perceived “safety risk” to society at large may “explain the relative 
litigation success enjoyed by ICE detainees and the relative failures 
experienced by those in custody because they were convicted of 
crimes.”430  Similar concerns may also account for courts’ relative greater 
willingness “to order individualized release in certain cases,” though this 
 
inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable 
termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” (quoting Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997))).  The language of 
Heck itself, however, suggests that there should be no bar, as these kinds of claims have nothing to do 
with the underlying criminal judgment.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“[I]f the district court determines that 
the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal 
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar 
to the suit.” (footnotes omitted)).   
 423.  Cf. RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 105 (2019) (tracing mass incarceration 
“to the shift from leaving judgments to professionals to allowing the masses to set policies directly”).  But 
cf. Rebecca Goldstein, Book Review, The Politics of Decarceration, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 448–49 (2019) 
(arguing that public opinion can by the same token advance reform and decarceration). 
 424.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 425.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text.  
 426.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2020); Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 
459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 418 (D. Conn. 2020); Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (C.D. Cal. 2020).  
Any correlation here may be a function of carceral architecture, given that such facilities tend to use 
dormitory-style housing that makes transmission of a disease like COVID-19 especially serious.  See 
supra note 340 and accompanying text.  It is also possible that it could have stemmed from decisions 
made by lawyers, who — perhaps figuring on an uphill climb to begin with — could have been 
unconsciously predisposed to more sympathetic plaintiffs.  Cf. Marie-Amelie George, The LGBT 
Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 559 (2018) 
(“Movement lawyers choose sympathetic plaintiffs, rather than representative ones, which can sow 
dissent.”); Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs 
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 306 n. 340 (1988) (“Indeed, 
emphasis upon a traditional plaintiff can focus the court’s attention too sharply on his circumstances rather 
than on the more general need for relief, as public interest lawyers know when they seek sympathetic 
plaintiffs for test cases.”). 
 427.  E.g., Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2020). 
 428.  Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 429.  Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 430.  Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 59.   
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willingness was also quite sparing.431 
Nevertheless, even in the low-security context, the concern remained 
that courts might just “dump inmates out into the streets.”432  Meanwhile, 
less sympathetic prisoners were without question also highly menaced by 
COVID-19, and the nature of their crimes did not go unnoticed.  As Judge 
Dow observed in Money:  
Plaintiffs seek a process that could result in the release of at least 12,000 
inmates.  That is almost one-third of the prison population in Illinois.  All 
of them are incarcerated because a jury convicted them of committing 
crimes, including some of the most serious crimes against our community.  
Many of them are violent offenders.  Compelling a process to potentially 
release thousands of inmates on an expedited basis could pose a serious 
threat to public safety and welfare.  The risk of recidivism comes into play, 
as do concerns about victims’ rights.  The question is not simply what is 
best for the inmates—the public has vital interests at stake, too.433 
While none of the litigants had, in fact, asked for the prison gates to be 
swung open, the tenor of many COVID-19 cases still indicated “a fear of 
too much justice.”434  There was little epistemic question that the 
situations were perilous or that truly effective prophylaxis was impossible 
inside the prison walls; few doubted that a lot of men (and no small 
number of women) were being left inside to take their chances with death, 
under the kinds of circumstances that the rest of society was doing 
everything in its power to avoid.435  Nevertheless, calling that situation a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment would have triggered a daunting 
remedial obligation.  Instead, the Eighth Amendment receded.  Like 
notable prison cases that preceded them, the COVID-19 cases offered 
“further examples of remedies driving rights, rather than the other way 
around.”436  
IV. PATHS FORWARD 
The classic law review Article introduces a problem; details its roots, 
 
 431.  See id. at 60.  
 432.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467, 480 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (emphasizing that 
this was not what petitioners were seeking), vacated, Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 433.  Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 2020); see also id. at 1111 (“The 
named Plaintiffs are ten individuals convicted of a range of felonies, including murder, aggravated 
kidnapping, and attempted robbery.”); id. at 1127 (“it is important to bear in mind that some portion of 
the incarcerated population has been convicted of the most serious crimes — murder, rape, domestic 
battery, and so on. Seven of the ten named Plaintiffs in fact are serving time for murder.”).  
 434.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 435.  Cf. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 165 (5th Cir. 2020) (admitting that “[a]s a matter of 
policy, TDCJ could have done more to protect vulnerable inmates in the Pack Unit” and that “TDCJ’s 
measures may have been unsuccessful” even if they “were not unconstitutional”). 
 436.  Levinson, supra note 404, at 882.  
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seams, and contours; and then concludes with some fresh, crisp 
suggestions for a resolution.  The COVID-19 cases do not fit well into the 
final act of that neat procession.  There was, after all, authority to release 
prisoners to safer forms of custody—indeed, Attorney General Barr had 
encouraged its vigorous use.437  The courts, too, had power.438  Lawyers 
were available to bring claims.  The danger was as well-documented and 
recognized as a problem could be: for the core period of these lawsuits, 
the COVID-19 pandemic was practically the only news around.  And 
indeed, the first major story to interrupt the pandemic’s full-saturation of 
cultural consciousness centered on racial injustice in U.S. law 
enforcement439—hardly a diminishment of the poignancy of the COVID-
19 petitioners’ and putative class members’ plight, given that a 
disproportionate number of them were people of color struggling within 
the downstream version of the same criminal-justice system.  
Nevertheless, the overall results from the COVID-19 cases suggest that 
large segments of America’s carceral system failed this stress test.440  
Despite positive, proactive efforts in some jurisdictions, a lot of 
prisoners—and a lot of legally innocent pretrial detainees—were left 
inside facilities where infection was likely and social distancing 
impossible.  In a year in which Americans as a whole fared poorly with 
COVID-19, prisoners—people whose health and “general well-being” 
society has assumed additional “responsibility for” by holding them 
involuntarily behind bars441—fared worse still.442  And the principal 
deficiency does not appear to have been tools but rather will. 
Still, significant improvements could be made to the tools available.  
The most straightforward improvement, which some state legislatures 
have been debating,443 would be to institute legislation at the state and 
federal levels that would empower judges to pause or revisit prison 
sentences on an individual or class-wide basis when a public-health 
emergency has been declared at a given facility.  Effectively, such a 
statute would authorize judges to reduce a sentence, grant bail, and/or stay 
a sentence until the danger has abated.  Such legislation would shore up 
the “enlargement” authority that federal judges, at least in most circuits, 
 
 437.  See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.  
 438.  See supra Sections I.C, III.A.  
 439.  See generally Helier Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This 
Time, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905.  
 440.  See also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 3 (“Every outbreak at a detention center is a 
public health crisis; together, they represent a national catastrophe that forced courts to consider the health-
protective rights of detainees during emergencies. The results are not encouraging.”).  
 441.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989). 
 442.  See supra note 12.  
 443.  See generally Ghandnoosh, supra note 46. 
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possess once a meritorious habeas claim has been brought.444  Of course, 
judges themselves could simply acknowledge and act on this power—but 
explicit statutory authority (and implicit support from a coequal branch of 
government) would not hurt. 
Legislative bodies could also help by making clear that exhaustion is 
not required—or that administrative remedies are not “available”—in the 
face of an emergency that urgently threatens the health of incarcerated 
people.445    In addition, as others have noted, they could update their 
states’ “good time” policies to foster another “simple, equitable way of 
getting lots of people out of prison safely, rather than continuing to 
incarcerate them in ever more dangerous and cruel conditions.”446 
Transparency regarding the actual conditions of incarceration may help 
too, as Dolovich argues.447  Indeed, a video leaked out of Elkton by an 
unknown prisoner generated significant public attention to the plight of 
prisoners there, which in turn may have helped spur Ohio Governor Mike 
DeWine to authorize the Ohio National Guard to provide assistance.448  It 
is possible, as many have suggested, that if the public really knew how 
bleak things were inside some of these facilities—through mandatory 
reporting, public oversight bodies, or greater press access—they would 
immediately demand change.449 
Certainly, such transparency cannot hurt.  We at least ought to know 
what is actually being done on our behalf.  Public officials lock away in 
government compounds not just the tiny fraction of people who have 
committed the most heinous offenses we can imagine but also the much 
larger number of people who have committed all sorts of lesser offenses.  
These people are locked away in crowded, chaotic, often unsanitary 
facilities, where social distancing is impossible, because of both 
institutional design and the sheer number of human beings packed into 
one space.  Such confinement is harmful and unnecessary, and it includes 
a cruel irony in the pandemic context, which is that the contagion risks 
are often worst for the lowest-security prisoners—those who, like the 
prisoners at Elkton, are deemed to pose a low-enough risk that they are 
 
 444.  See supra Sections III.A, III.E.  
 445.  See supra Section III.D.  Again, as with the enlargement authority, courts could simply 
recognize these exceptions in existing law. 
 446.  See Emily Widra & Wanda Bertram, More States Need to Use Their “Good Time” Systems 
to Get People out of Prison During COVID-19, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 12, 2021), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/01/12/good-time/.  
 447.  Dolovich, supra note 1, at 30–34.  
 448.  See Ali Gostanian, Video Shows Inmate Pleading for Help Inside Ohio Federal Prison, NBC 
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/live-blog/2020-04-08-
coronavirus-news-n1178891/ncrd1179476#blogHeader; see also Dolovich, supra note 1, at 10 n.17, 13.  
 449.  Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Assuming 
knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in 
my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”).  
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warehoused in open-bay dormitories rather than the locked cells that 
people often see on TV shows.450  Many of these prisoners are elderly and 
infirm,451 having long aged-out of any propensity to commit crimes.452  
They remain locked away nonetheless. 
While some who advocate on behalf of prisoners do so because they 
have been “inspired by the notion of a preferential option for the poor,”453 
no one in the COVID-19 cases was asking for the prisoners to be more 
protected from COVID-19 than anyone else.  The crux of the cases was 
that, while being imprisoned in this country is rarely healthful, the nature 
of incarceration within these facilities during a pandemic like COVID-19 
raised the punishment to a level that could not comport with the Eighth 
Amendment.  Prisoners sought relief from the federal courts to blunt a 
dramatic disparity: conditions making them substantially more likely to 
die than everyone else.454  The relief they sought would have benefited 
not just them and their families, but also prison staff, who also deserve to 
work under safe and humane conditions.455 
Last, but certainly not least, prisoners and lawyers who advocate on 
their behalf can learn from what happened in 2020.  Though the legal 
precedents that the COVID-19 cases generated are mostly dispiriting, 
there are possibilities for successful litigation efforts.  The ability of 
prisoners, in at least some jurisdictions, to bring § 2241 habeas claims 
asserting that “no set of conditions would be constitutionally sufficient”456 
will allow prisoners to overcome the PLRA’s often-formidable barrier to 
the courthouse doors.  And while class-wide procedures would be 
efficient for such claims, they are not required: prisoners facing 
particularly extreme health risks at carceral facilities that are unable to 
protect them (and their attorneys) could bring these as individual claims 
as well. 
We will likely face another pandemic before too long.457  I hope that 
 
 450.  See supra note 340 and accompanying text.    
 451.  See Li & Lewis, supra note 15. 
 452.  See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–472 (2012); Carl Zimmer, You’re An Adult. 
Your Brain, Not So Much., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/science/youre-an-adult-your-brain-not-so-much.html.  
 453.  Cf. Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau, Rethinking Health and Human Rights: Time for a 
Paradigm Shift, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655, 662 (2002).  
 454.  See supra note 12.  
 455.  Cf. Shane Hoover, Elkton Prison Union Chief Talks Coronavirus [E]ffect on Staff, 
TIMESREPORTER.COM (Apr. 9, 2020, 5:32 AM), https://www.timesreporter.com/news/20200409/elkton-
prison-union-chief-talks-coronavirus-affect-on-staff (quoting union president representing Elkton 
employees as saying that there was “anger from the staff here,” as well as “angst, anxiety because their 
story isn’t out there and they feel as if the Bureau of Prisons is doing nothing to help their first-line staff 
members”). 
 456.  E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020).  
 457.  E.g., Melissa Davey, WHO Warns Covid-19 Pandemic Is ‘Not Necessarily the Big One,’ THE 
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this Article will be helpful to incarcerated people and their advocates in 
the unhappy event that we do.  More importantly, I hope that by then we 
will have changed our system of criminal adjudication and incarceration 
enough so that we will not again force the people who live and work in 




Guardian (Dec. 29, 2020, 1:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/29/who-warns-covid-
19-pandemic-is-not-necessarily-the-big-one; Leslie Hook, The Next Pandemic: Where Is It Coming From 
and How Do We Stop It?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2a80e4a2-7fb9-
4e2c-9769-bc0d98382a5c. 
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